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Putting Rivers Back in the Landscape:
The Revival of Watershed Management in the United States
A. Dan Tarock*
1. Introduction: Rivers and Watersheds as Commodities
At the dawn of the progressive conservation era, river basin planning and
watershed management were to be the centerpieces of water resources
planning.' For most of this century, however, natural resources policies and laws
have promoted watershed degradation. Today, the resource values2 of
watershed ecosystems are being rediscovered. The current revival of interest in
watershed management in the United States is driven by a variety of not entirely
consistent factors. Watershed management is seen as an alternative to costly
command and control water pollution regulation or, more broadly, as the logical
progression from the early focus on individual discharges to a more "ecorealistic
context"3 which seeks to prevent pollution rather than to treat waste discharges
and drinking water. The watershed is the preferred problem-solving method of
the federal Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") as it tries to stop nonpoint
sources of pollution from canceling out the gains from point controls.4 More
generally, watershed management reflects the recognition that we can only
*A. Dan Tarlock, Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965,
Stanford University. This paper was initially prepared for an International Conference on
Integrated Water and Land Management held at the Faculty of Law at the Queensland
University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia, July 11-12, 1996. The conference
was organized by Professor Douglas Fisher and I would like to thank him for expanding my
knowledge of comparative watershed management law.
1. See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE
PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959). This book is the standard in the
United States history of river basin development ideology.
2. Economists now value natural resources by their total economic value, which includes
traditional use, as well as passive non-use values such as ecological services. See NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCL, VALUING GROUNDWATER . EcONOMIc CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES 48-44 (1997).
3. See Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & CoM. 549,553(1996).
4. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Water Quality Standards, INSIDE EPA'S
WATER POLICY REPORT, June 29, 1998.
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sustain biodiversity by managing entire ecosystems. For example, the
preservation of the Florida Everglades requires that the entire watershed. be
managed to prevent their continuing degradation.'
The rediscovery of watershed values is nationwide, but it has special relevance
in the Western United States. Many Western river basins are stressed from a variety
of land and water use practices, especially nonpoint sources of pollution. Salmon
are on the brink of extinction in the rivers along the Pacific coast. Their perilous
condition has been brought about by a combination of damming, timber harvesting
practices, agricultural run-off and diversions, as well as non-anthropocentirc climate
cycles. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is stressed from upstream diversions that
increase the risk of saltwater intrusion in dry years. Many smaller watersheds face a
variety of stresses. For example, Salt Lake City is concerned that the 2002 Winter
Olympics will put new stresses on its watershed which has provided high quality
water since Brigham Young declared City Creek a protected drinking water source in
1851. A major winter storm could shut down the city's Mountain Dell reservoir due
to salt run-off from 1-80, and an increase in backcountry camping could increase the
risk of contamination to the drinking water supply.6
Watershed management is politically attractive because it has the potential to
promote consensus rather than conflict.7 Many watersheds have experienced bitter and
prolonged conflicts over the application of national standards to longstanding land and
water use practices. The watershed can be a focus for local interests to resolve conflicts,
consistent with federal standards, because diverse stakeholders possess a common
interest in a specific resource that will allow them to transcend their differences. Many
permanent and special river basin management agencies and ad hoc watershed
coalitions have sprung up in recent years and are potential partners for EPA and other
federal agencies to craft specific solutions to "place-based" controversies. However, the
institutions that have supported watershed degradation are difficult- to reform, as well as
slow to adapt to the effort to use the watershed as a "problem-shed" because they
presume that nature must be improved for human benefit.
A. We Love Nature But We Love to Improve Her More
The basic cause of watershed degradation is human manipulation of river
systems and the conversion of adjacent watershed land to urban, industrial and
5. See generally Thomas H. Ankersen & Richard Hamann, Ecosystems, Management, and the
Everglades: A Legal and Institutional Analysis, Il J. LAND USE & ENrL. L. 473 (1996). For a further
discussion of the Everglades protection efforts, see discussion infra Section V.B.
6. See Watersheds/Utah--2002 Winter Olympics, WESTERN STATES WATER (Weekly Newsletter
of the W. States Water Council, Midvale, Utah), December 31, 1998, at 1-2.
7. This assertion is more a hope than a reflection of experience. For a penetrating theoretical
but skeptical review of consensus processes, see DOUGLAS S. KENNEY, ARGUING ABOUT CONSENSUS:
EXAMINING THE CASE AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED INrrAnvES AND OTHER CowLBORA'nVE GROUPS IN
NATURAL RESOURcES MArENrEr (University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center 2000).
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agricultural use. Degradation is a global environmental problem, and throughout
the world, countries are trying to integrate land and water use planning and
regulation in watersheds or catchment basins. This integration is extremely
difficult because it cuts against the grain of history and the legal expectations that
developed from this history. The story of modem civilization is largely one of
accelerating watershed development. Until the last one hundred years, river
behavior was a constraint on river and corridor development; thus, land and water
management were integrated by inherent physical limitations.8 Technology
enabled us to remove the previous limitations on river and watershed
development and produced the current nonintegrated watershed management
characterized by: (1) the transformation of rivers from natural to artificial systems,
and (2) unsustainable watershed development and land use practices.
Scientists in the United States have long been aware of the costs of
unplanned and unregulated watershed development, and they have advocated
integrated watershed planning and management as the cornerstone of river
basin development. However, for most of the twentieth century the ideal of
integrated watershed management was subordinated to intensive, structural
multiple-purpose river basin water project development in the name of scientific
conservation.9 We have conserved water, but not the landscapes and
ecosystems that produced it. The result was massive watershed degradation
because the land uses that result from the conversion of riparian land,
especially flood plains, to more intensive uses were largely unregulated and
unplanned. The consequences of this neglect of watersheds include difficult to
control sources of water pollution, productive land inundated by large
impoundments," and destroyed or changed forest ecosystems." For example,
8. For a good application of this thesis to the ancient Mediterranean world, see 1.
DONALD HUGHES, PAN'S TRAVAIL: ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS OF THE ANCIENT GREEKS AND ROMANS
35-40 (1994). Hughes argues that religious beliefs combined with the limits of available
science and technology were used to promote sustainable resource patterns. However,
neither the Egyptians nor the Greeks and Romans were good watershed managers.
Deforestation, overgrazing and erosion permanently changed the Mediterranean landscape
to the bleak, if romantic, one that we know today. See id. at 73-90.
9. See generally HAYS, supra note 1.
10. One of the most extensive and sad examples of impoundment occurred in the Upper
Missouri river basin. Five main stem flood control reservoirs built in the 1940-50s took 550 square
miles of the Native American tribal lands with "nominal" tribal benefits. See JOHN E. THORSON, RIVER
OF PROMISE, RIVEROF PERIL: THE POLITICS OF MANAGING THE MISSOURI RIVER80-83 (1994).
11. For example, dams and diversions on the Columbia River and timber harvesting
practices on the tributaries have virtually destroyed valuable salmon runs. See, e.g., WILLIAM
DErRICH, NoRTHwEsT PASSAGE: THE GREAT COLUMBA RIVER (1995). Additionally, fish-timber
harvesting conflicts are now pervasive on many watersheds. See, e.g., Swanson v. United
States Forest Service, 87 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 1996) (providing review of forest management
plan's effect on listed salmon species).
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flood control dams and levees opened up flood plains to development,
although, paradoxically, structural flood control measures increase the cost of
floods when they occur by inducing extensive development in the flood plain. 2
Large-scale arid region irrigation schemes produce salty soils and downstream
saline and toxic pollution, as well as waterlogged land.'3 Intensive timber
harvesting practices pollute rivers and contribute to the decline of historic fish
runs.4 These adverse impacts have been well documented by geographers" and
others. Most societies, however, have been unable to prevent and mitigate these
impacts and, in fact, often make them worse by continuing to subsidize
inappropriate watershed activities."
B. The Watershed Restoration Agenda: Difficulties In Moving From
Theory to Practice
Ambitious experiments are underway to restore many degraded river systems
and to protect healthy watersheds from future degradation. This effort requires
myriad site-specific and regulatory efforts ranging from education and voluntary
adoption of new land management practices to the reduction of withdrawals and
the construction of new water conservation facilities. These varied efforts have three
common themes. First, many traditional land and water management practices
12. See DANIEL B. BoKIN, OUR NATIURAL HISTORY: THE LESSONS OF LEWIS AND CLARK 21-38 (1995).
There is vast technical literature on the irrationality of the use of dams as the primary flood reduction
strategy. See, e.g., ELMER THEODORE, BIG DAM FOOLISHNESS: THE PROBLEM OF MODERN FLOOD CONTROL AND
WATER STORAGE (1954); LUNA B. LEORDLD, THE FLOOD CONTROL CONmOvERsy: BIG DAMS, LTTLE DAMS, AND
LAND MANAGEMENT (1954); Gi3u~r WHTE, FLOOD HAZARD IN THE UNITED STATES: A RESEARCH ASSEssMEN'r
(1975); HENRY BERESFORD-PEIRSE, FORESTS, FOOD, AND PEOPLE (1968); PETER BLACK, CONSERVATION OF
WATER AND RELATED LAND SOURCES (1982); RAYMOND 1. BURBY, FLOOD PLAIN LAND USE MANAGEMENP A
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT (1985); ROBERT N STAVINS, FORES WETLAND DEPLETION IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS
OF UNINTENDED CONSEOUENCES OF FEDERAL POLICYAND PROGRAMS (1988).
13. See, e.g., PHILIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST
(1981); PETER BEAUMONT, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN DRYLANDS (1989).
14. For example, the National Marine Fisheries Service listed the northem Califomia
coast Coho salmon as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act, and
identified the adverse impacts of timber harvesting practices on coastal stream systems as
one of the factors contributing to the decline of the species. See Endangered and Threatened
Species, 61 Fed. Reg. 56,138 (1996) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 227).
15. See ANDREW GOUDIE, THE HUMAN IMPACT ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 177-234 (4th
ed. 1993).
16. Since 1968, the federal government has provided subsidized flood insurance
conditioned on the adoption of local flood plain land use regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 4001-
4028 (1994). A recent assessment notes that "lplparticipation in NFP river floodplains and
flood-prone areas is high .... yet many experts believe that the results have been minimal."
Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVrL. L. 973, 1034-35 (1995).
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must be modified to restore the region's ecological health and protect the region
from future degradation. 7 Second, these efforts require both new management
practices and the application of technology. Third, although these efforts must be
tailored to specific watersheds, they often must be integrated into emerging large
river basin restoration and management regimes. In short, effective prevention,
mitigation and remediation of negative environmental impacts requires no less than
a reversal of our country's deeply entrenched urbanization, agricultural and
silviculture production patterns. It also requires awareness that technological
manipulation of natural systems, especially rivers and forests, is always beneficial. 8
The idea that the benefits of improving nature always exceed the costs is
difficult to reverse because it is so deeply embedded in the law and philosophy
of watershed use. We have been conditioned to appreciate the value of altered
managed riverine landscapes. 9 Historically, the flow of large river systems and
their adjacent corridors have been perceived as under-used natural resources
that should be extensively developed or used for waste disposal. Thus, rivers
have often been conceptually and functionally "detached" from their
surrounding landscape. River corridors ceased to be considered resources that
should be subject to special protection regimes.20 In the United States, large
river systems have been viewed as commodities' and this has contributed to
17. See generally RECLAIMING THE NATIVE HOME OF HOPE: COMMUNITY, ECOLOGY AND THE
AMERICAN WEST (Robert B. Keiter ed., 1998) (providing a collection of essays which redefine
the western landscape to balance human use and ecosystem functions).
18. Criticism of this assumption has been a persistent theme in environmental thinking. See
genenally THEDORE SWERNBERG, SLIDE MOUNIrAN ORTHE FoLLYOFOWNING NATURE (1995).
19. Stv I.G. SmlvMONS, ENVIRONMENTAL HmoRY: NEW PERSPEOnVES ON ii-iE PASr 29-41 (1993)
(providing a brief survey of the principal forces behind the counter-environmental transformation).
20. The reintegration of water and land is supported by the current recharacterization of
biodiversity conservation as the primary purpose of environmental regulation. This is a helpful
paradigm shift, but biodiversity preservation remains primarily a land rather than water-based
science. Biodiversity protection has centered almost exclusively on the creation of large, terrestrial
biodiversity reserves rather than on the protection and restoration of river corridors, and thus
ironically has reinforced the detachment of rivers from their surrounding landscapes. Biodiversity
strategies must be rethought to focus on watersheds with rivers in the center (rather than as an edge)
to enhance the protection of whole systems. Unlike the usual two-dimensional biodiversity
protection strategy, this reconfigured watershed geometry is three-dimensional. Watersheds are not
only long and narrow, but deep, and are measured from ridge top to river bottom. A watershed
biodiversity strategy would ensure protection of more species than would a land-based strategy. As
John Haubert, a river specialist 'in the Department of Interior, observed, "one well-placed river with
50,000 acres might be more important than 500,000 acres of wilderness or national park on a glacier."
TIM PALMER, THEWILDANDScENc R]VERsOFAMERIcA 34 (1993) (quoting John Haubert).
21. The influence of western European law and economic theory on the perception of
land and related resources as commodities, from the time of settlement, has been explored
brilliantly by environmental historian William Cronon. See, e.g., WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES IN
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the "detachment" of rivers from their surrounding ecosystems. Both science and
law have contributed to the "detachment" of rivers from their watersheds:
Hydrology is the science of river manipulation22 and geographers concerned
with possible adverse effects of the relationship between river unmodified and
river behavior were relegated to a marginal status. Law turned both land and
water into commodities to facilitate intensive development.
This article examines the new focus on the resource values of "ecologically
healthy" watersheds from two perspectives. First, it takes a historical perspective
to demonstrate why it is difficult to achieve effective integrated land and water
management. The "negative" thesis of this article is that the major obstacle to
integrated watershed management is the persistence of entitlements to use
land and water without regard to the adverse environmental watershed impacts.
This article explains the theoretical underpinning of the laws that govern the use
of river systems and their watersheds in the United States. Doing so provides
the context to understand the problems that ongoing efforts to implement an
ecosystem approach to river management face.
The second perspective examines the efforts to promote ecologically healthy
watersheds. Watershed governance is a paradox because the idea is being promoted
by those who want to substitute top-down command and control regulations for
voluntary and collaborative problem solving to achieve national environmental
objectives. However, neither the federal environmental programs nor the
Constitution are well adapted to support these efforts, and substantial legal
questions exist about the use of local programs either to define or to implement a
federal standard. On a more positive note, the article concludes that a new vision of
urban and rural landscapes and the relationship between human settlement and
natural systems is required to address the adverse impacts of river and watershed
development. At the present time, the future of the West's unique landscape is
uncertain, however there are signs that a new balance between respect for the
natural values and functions of larid and water and human use is emerging.
THE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, AND THE ECOLOGY OF NEW ENGLAND (1983); WILLIAM CRONON,
NATURE'S METROPOLIS (1991). The adverse consequences of the "commodification" of nature
is, of course, the central theme of modem environmentalism. See Lester W. Milbrath, The
World is Relearning Its Story About How It Works, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLmCS IN*THE INTERNATIONAL
ARENA. MOVEMENTS, PARnES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND POUCY 21, 41 (Sheldon Kamieniecki ed,
1993).
22. See COMMITTEE ON OPPORTUNITIES IN THE HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, OPPORTUNITES IN THE HYDROLOGIC SCIENCES 38-43 (1991).
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I. The Role of Water Law In Detaching Rivers From Their Corridors
A. Competing River Visions
Water law has contributed to watershed degradation by making it easy to
disrupt hydrologic and ecosystem functions by dewatering watersheds. We are now
beginning to calculate the high social and environmental costs of maximum
development, and this calculation is creating a counter-ethic to the historic one of
maximum commodity development. In the United States, the costs are primarily
environmental and, to a much lesser extent, social.23 However, in the developing
world the costs are equally environmental and social-foreign dam projects often
have devastating impacts on local subsistence economies.24 As a result of domestic
and international environmental and human rights movements, supported by fifty
years of economic criticism of the efficiency of public investment in water resources
projects, the idea that regional multiple-purpose river projects will provide both fair
and efficient economic development has been challenged. Dam projects in
developing countries have been opposed because they displace minority
populations, inequitably distribute water, and often fail to deliver the promised
economic benefits.2
Two river function visions, maximum development of the water resource
and maintenance of the ecological integrity of large river systems, now compete
for policy dominance.26 Ecological integrity still remains subordinate to the
older vision of maximum exploitation, however there have been a number of
recent national and grassroots efforts' to implement ecological sustainable
watershed management practices. United States and international water
allocation rules support maximum development that reinforces the detachment
of land and water. Water law reflects the assumption that the manipulation of
nature should be encouraged and thus does not incorporate the full social costs
of altered flow patterns and watershed functions. Water law treats rivers as
commodities separate and apart from land, which is itself a commodity. Water
law has effectively created "quasi-exclusive" property rights to put the right to
exploit and consume water on the same footing as the right to develop land.
23. One example of social disruption occurred in Hawaii. Native Hawaiians now
criticize the commodification of watersheds during the period that the islands were a United
States territory and the consequent destruction of the indigenous communal taro culture.
See Elizabeth Ann Ho'oipo et al., Cultures in Conflict in Hawai'i: The Law and Politics of Native
Hawaiian Water Rights, 18 U. HAW. L. REv. 71,83-97 (1996).
24. SeegenerlyW.M. ADAMS, WASINGTHE RAN: RIERS, POPtEANDPLANNNG INAFRIcA( 1992).
25. See generally BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH (1994); E. GOLDSMITH & N. HILDYARD,
THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS (1984).
26. See A. Dan Tarlock, River Management in the Twenty-First Century: The Vision Thing, 6
RIVERS: STUDIES IN THE SCIENCE, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND LAW OF INSTREAM FLow 43 (1997).
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Water law directly supported the destruction of the ecological integrity of rivers
and their flood plains by allowing unlimited human alteration of watersheds.
This same story forland is told in the next section.
Throughout the world, the theory that water and river basins are simply
under-developed commodities is being replaced with a focus on the
maintenance of the ecological integrity of the watershed as the major planning
and management objective. The goal of maximum physical development
through multiple-use projects, which dominated water-and land use thinking
until the late 1960s, has been challenged and supplemented by the sustainable
ecosystem paradigm. This paradigm posits that river systems are dynamic, ever-
changing ecosystems which serve a variety of purposes from the maintenance of
consumptive uses to the maintenance of the river's historic natural functions for
both anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric reasons.27 The newer ecological
integrity vision is less clearly articulated than the older vision because it rests on
a complex and dynamic view of nature and humankind's role in the functioning
of natural systems.2" It is not a simple river preservation concept, but rather one
that advocates integrating human use of a river system with the maintenance of
its natural environmental sustainability.2 9 Integrated watershed planning and
management will not be effective unless we find ways to incorporate the costs of
watershed degradation into private entitlements. This newer river basin vision
seeks to provide a framework for integration of watershed planning and
management by identifying a river's hydrograph and the natural functions
sustained by the flow over time and by recognizing that property rights must be
defined in relation to the watershed community as well as to the individual right
holder. These functions include the maintenance both of natural systems, such
as wetlands, and human economies. The flow cycle of the pre-Aswan Dam Nile
27. See generally Anthony Scott & Georgia Coustalin, The Evolution of Water Rights, 35 NAT.
RESOURCES 1. 821 (1995). This article surveys the growing tension between the commodity
and community-conservation visions and suggests that new trusts will emerge to lold water
rights for instream as well as out of stream uses and that river corporations will be created
to manage water for the full range of uses.
28. The leading exposition in the United States of this thesis is DANIEL BoT3IN, DiscoPDANTr
HARMONIEs (1991). For an exploration of the potential influence of the non-equilibrium paradigm
of environmental law, see A. Dan Tarlock, The Non-Equilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial
Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 oy. L.A. L. REv. 1121 (1994), and Fred P. Bosselman & A Dan
Tarlock, The lnfluence of Ecological Science on American Law: An Introduction, 69CH.-KErL. REv. 847 (1994).
For lawyers looking for a good introduction to modem ecology and its influence on
environmental management, see JUDY L. MEYER, Changing Concepts of System Management, in
SUSAINING OUR WATER RESOURCES 78 (Water Science and Technology Board ed. 1993), and Judy L.
Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KErrL. REw. 875 (1994).
29. See REPORT OF THE WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADvisoRY CoMMiSSION, WATER IN THE
WESr: CHALLENGE FORTHE NEXT CENTURY 3-1 to 3-3 (1998).
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is the classic example of the ecological-social vision," as the post-dam river is a
prime example of the commodity vision. This new river basin vision has its roots
in bioregionalism,3' the long and ineffective history of watershed planning in the
United States, and an interest in the implementation of environmental policy on
both large and small scales.32
The emerging sustainable ecosystem paradigm is still too crude and
imprecise to provide concrete guidance about the precise balance between
development and environmental protection in a specific watershed. For
example, the paradigm can support a range of approaches. These vary from the
creation of narrow river corridor vegetation preservation bands to buffer the river
from permitted development, to a more radical ecological ideal that the
maintenance or restoration of the "natural" functions of river systems and their
flood plains should control development patterns.33 However, the sustainable
ecosystem paradigm is a radical break with the past view that rivers and
watersheds should be developed intensely. This paradigm also provides the
basis for using rational hydrologic and land use background levels as the
foundation for watershed management.34
B. Water Rights, Multiple Use and Integrated Watershed
Management
Water law has historically contributed to nonintegrated watershed
management by removing natural river behavior as a constraint on watershed
development. The law has facilitated the regulation of rivers and transwatershed
diversions. There are, however, some hopeful counter-trends. In recent years,
the law has contributed to the maintenance of instream flows. Instream flow
protection is an important component of integrated watershed management. A
few American states are beginning to integrate water and land use to try to
30. Nile inigation began to be modified in the nineteenth century and barrages and dams
were constructed to regulate the River's flow, but historic pattems were relatively maintained until
the construction of the High Aswan Dam. See generally H. E. HuRsr, THE NILE (1952).
3 1. Australia is a leader in this movement. See, e.g., J. M. POWELL, THE EMERGENCE OF
BIOREGIONALISM IN THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN (1993).
32. For a comprehensive survey of the factors that contribute to the current interest
in watershed-based protection strategies, see Adler, supra note 16, at 1057-79.
33. Professor Ludwik A. Teclaff has been one leading advocates of the need to
recognize the benefits of historic flood cycles as well as the benefits of flood control. See
generally Ludwik A. Teclaff, Treaty Practice Related to Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT. RESOURCES I.
109 (1991); LUDVWKA. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW (1967).
34. See The Independent Scientific Group, Return to the River. An Ecological Vision for the
Recovery of Columbia River Salmon, 28 ENVTL. L. 503 (1998) (explaining the sustainable
ecosystem paradigm as applied to the Columbia River).
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ensure that development does not outstrip available water supplies, 5 but the
legacy of water management as physical conservation remains strong.
The movement to conserve water resources originated in scientific surveys
of the American West36 and the need to find a formula to sustain the settlement
of the nation's arid and semiarid areas.17 Scientific conservation theory was
driven by theories of production efficiency and assumed that the entire river
system should be intensively developed and managed to maximize its economic
potential through large-scale, multiple-use projects. Multiple-use became the
organizing principle of both public and private water development management.
The major uses were irrigation, municipal and industrial, hydroelectric power
generation and flood control.3" Environmental values were largely absent from
this calculation or, when present, were secondary. "Conservation" provided the
scientific and political bases for the principle of maximum water development
that flowered between the turn of the century and the mid- 1960s.
Scientific conservation did not separate land from water; in fact, early
proponents of conservation recognized the close relationship between land and
water management and the importance of regulating land use in the watershed.
The conservation movement, however, set in motion the process of separation
by making water development paramount to watershed management. The
United States has a long history of failed attempts to integrate water and land
use because it has always opted for structural river development rather than
integrated resource management.39 The debate regarding water resources in the
United States has, in fact, been dominated by the idea of comprehensive and
coordinated federal river basin development to promote efficiency and social
equity. At the height of the Conservation Era, President Theodore Roosevelt
appointed the Inland Waterways Commission, which recommended a federal
waterways commission to coordinate all river basin development. A fight
between the older Corps of Engineers and the new Bureau of Reclamation,
35. See A. Dan 'Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS WEsT-NoRTI-IHEsr I. OF ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
182 (1998/1999).
36. See generally WILLAM H. GoETZMANN, EXPLORATION AND EMPIRE: THE EXPLORER AND THE
SCIENTISTS IN THE WINNING OFTHE AMERICAN WEST (1966).
37. See, e.g., DONALD WORSTER, RIvERS OF EMPIRE (1985); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT:
THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986).
38. See Stephen McCaffrey, The Evolution of the Law of International Watercourses, 45 AusT L.
INT'L L. 87 (1993).
• 39. The basic reason for structural development has been the ease with which the central
govemment--either state or federal--could construct water resources projects combined with
the impossibility of controlling the development of the basin because the river basin is not a
political unit. See Norman Wengert, The River Basin Concept as Seen From a Management Perspective, in
STRATEGIES FORRvER BASIN MANAGEMENT 287, 299, (Lunquist, et al., 1985).
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however, led to the rejection of coordinated river management. Thus, after a ten-
year fight, any hope of federal integrated watershed planning died in Congress.
Congress did create a regional development authority to promote social
equity in the Tennessee Valley region. The Tennessee Valley Authority has become
a global model of river basin development, but it has never been repeated on any
other United States river. River basins are not natural political boundaries and the
states and powerful constituencies refuse to cede political power to the federal
government or an independent political body. Intensive federal water resources
planning programs were put in place between the 1930 and 1970s, however their
objective was primarily to facilitate the construction of large, multi-purpose
reservoirs to subsidize regional development.4" Non-consumptive uses and non-
structural flood control measures remained secondary to engineering solutions
that encouraged maximum use and development.4'
During the New Deal, there were efforts to focus on the land use impacts of
federal development,42 however these efforts were unsuccessful, as was another
effort in the 1960s. Between 1965 and 1980, seven river basin commissions with
broad planning powers to coordinate federal and state water and related land use
development were formed, but their promise was never realized. As the influential
National Water Commission noted in 1973, "[wjater planning sometimes appears
to be an end in itself.43 Ultimately Congress ignored the experience by defunding
the program. River planning in general has fallen into dispute in part because the
environmental movement took full advantage of the economic criticisms of
subsidized regional water development virtually to shut down large-scale federal
dam construction. Thus, the driving force behind national river basin planning had
exhausted itself by the mid- 1970s.
C. Water Law: The Creation of the Right to Consume
1. The Common Law of Riparian Rights
The common law of water rights is a land-based water allocation system
that could serve as a watershed-based conservation regime,44 but it has
generally performed this function only by default. A riparian right is a
40. See BEATRICE HoRr HOLMES, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRiC., Misc. PUB. No. 1233, A HISTORY OF
FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS 1800-1960 (1972); BEATRICE HO r HOLMES, U.S. DEP'T OF
AGRic., MISC. PUB. No. 1379, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS 1960-1970 (1979).
41. See INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT REwEW COMMITTEE, SHARING THE
CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 2 1ST CENTURY 142-143 (1994).
42. See generally NATIONAL RESOURCES COMMITTEE, REGIONAL FACTORS IN NATIONAL
PLANNING (1935).
43. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 366 (1973).
44. See Lynda Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian Jurisdiction: Defining
the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. PITt. L. REv. 95, 111-115 (1987).
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usufructory right to use a portion of the flow of a watercourse that arises by
virtue of ownership of land bordering a stream or lakes.45 The common law of
riparian rights limited use to riparians within a watershed and prohibited each
riparian from diminishing the natural flow of the stream.46 Under the pressure of
industrialization and urbanization, the common law has been modified to allow
water to be used consumptively and in some cases away from the river corridor
and watershed when there is no substantial injury to other users.47 For example,
the merits of riparian rights were extensively debated in California in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. Upstream users, especially electric
utilities, were afraid that the doctrine would block access to water and
contribute to the monopolization of the resource by downstream users.
Today, California and most other states have solved the problem by
permitting the reasonable use of water.48 The reasonable use doctrine replaced
the natural flow doctrine and allows the appropriation of surplus water (water
beyond that used by riparians) for storage and use outside the watershed.49 All
in all, the doctrine has not blocked access to consumptive uses by major users.
Municipalities have exercised the power of eminent domain to condemn water
rights outside of their territorial limits and to transfer water to areas of demand.
In many states it is becoming easier to sever water rights from riparian land.5"
The common law had a per se rule against transwatershed diversions. At both
the federal level and in most states, however, an environmental impact
assessment processes has been substituted per se prohibitions against
movement across watershed boundaries.
Groundwater allocation is another example of the use of water law to divorce
land from water. In arid areas, groundwater law helps to deplete streams and the
45. See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 32
(Richard Dewsnup & Dallin Jensen eds., 1973).
46. See Butler, supra note 44, at I11.
47. See, e.g., Pyle v. Gilbert, 265 S. E. 2d 584 (1980). However, the watershed rule continues to
surface in new contexts. In 1994, Florida created a commission to review its water management law,
which has liberal transbasin transfer rules. Water-rich counties convinced the commission to
recommend to the legislature that local sources be favored. Before a trans-basin diversion could be
authorized, a water management district would have to consider the proximity of the source to the
proposed destination and the availability of altemative sources of water. Two commentators have
characterized the recommendation as "a partial revival of the common law rule that prohibited the
diversion of water to use on nonriparian lands." Marcia Penman Parker & Sally Bond Man, Water
Management: Mission Impossible?, 70 FLA BAR. 1.20, 28 (1996).
48. SeeCAL.CONsT.artX,§2.
49. See Clifford Schultz & Gregory Weber, Changing Judicial Attitudes Toward California
Water Resources: From Vested Rights to Utilitarian Reallocations, 19 PAC. L.J. 1031, 1041 (1988).
50. See Richard Harnsberger, Eminent Domain and Water Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 325, 366-69
(1969). See generally Thomas Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by Municipalities, 57
MICH. L. REv. 349 (1959).
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dependent riparian vegetation because the common law neither constrains use on
overlying land nor prohibits transfers to centers of demand." In addition, the
common law treats groundwater as a separate source of water from streams, and
thus pumpers may exercise their rights to dewater streams and their vegetation
corridors without regard to the impact on riparian surface rights. 2 Groundwater was
initially allocated by the ownership of overlying surface land, however this has
created greater conservation and environmental problems because no comparable
riparian sharing limitations were imposed upon use." In some states, this rule has
been modified to impose minimal sharing obligations. 4
Public utility law has also promoted urban growth in watersheds. Water
suppliers have assumed that they have a duty to meet any demand, although public
utility law in fact gives suppliers more discretion to match service with supply."
Modem statutes are rapidly eroding the assumption that there is an absolute duty to
serve. States are beginning to follow Arizona's lead in linking water supply planning
51. See COMMITTEE ON CHARACrERIZATION OF WETLANDS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
WETLANDS: CHARACTERISTICS AND BOUNDARIES 153-155 (1995).
52. There have been some efforts at integration. See A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER
RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4.11 (The Clark Broadman Environmental Law Series Vol. 1, 1988).
However, in the majority of states, the two legal regimes often operate independently of
each other.
53. See id.
54. Two rules developed to allocate the resource. Under the absolute ownership rule, an
overlying landowner can use as much water as he can pump unless the -purpose is malicious.
Many courts modified the absolute ownership rule by adopting the reasonable use rule, but this
is not an effective limitation on most uses. A pumper may still use as much as can be pumped,
without regard to surface stream impacts, so long as the use is for a productive purpose and is
confined to the overlying land. Neither of these rules prevents rapid exploitation or prior use.
Modem law only provides small pumpers who have been dewatered a right of compensation. The
Restatement of Torts provides large-scale pumpers may be liable for if "the withdrawal of
groundwater unreasonably causes harm to a proprietor of neighboring land," RESTATEMENT
(SECONDJ OFTORTS § 858 (1979). See as0 Cline v. American Aggregates Corp., 474 N. E. 2d 324 (Ohio
1984), Prior appropriation often produces the same result because it is difficult to apply priority
principles to groundwater, and thus priorities are seldom enforced. For example, most states have
rejected a senior "right to lift" because it would freeze pressure levels and discourage subsequent
use. See Wayman v. Murray City Corp. 458 P.2d 861 (1969). juniors have a right to lower pressure to
a "reasonable" level. States have taken some steps to correct the anti-conservation incentives of
these rules. In some states, ground and surface fights are integrated, but the purpose of the law is
mainly to protect senior surface users and not the ecological integrity of the watershed. Many arid
states have conservation regimes which could be used to promoted integrated management, but
historically they have not been so used.
55. SeeA. DAN TARLOCK, LAWOFWATER RIGHTSAND RESOURCES § 5.13[b1 (1988).
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and urban growth. 6 For example, a 1995 California law requires that environmental
impact statements ("EIS") for large project assess the capacity of the public water
provider to meet the existing and future demands of the project." This imposes
important new planning responsibilities on local governments. A California case holds
that an EIS for a large real estate development is deficient if it defers consideration of
the adequacy of water supplies for the entire project.58 In Stanislaus, a county authorized
a resort in the foothills of the Sierra Nevada Mountains that would be followed by
residential units.59 No long-term water supply was available for the residential
component of the project, and the court held that the water supply issue could not be
deferred until a subsequent EIS which assessed the residential phase of the project
could be completed.'
2. The Law of Prior Appropriation
Prior appropriation is the ultimate river and watershed engine of
destruction because it allows the last possible amount of a stream to be
diverted and depleted to satisfy prior rights. For example, in the last major
Western drought, small trout streams in Montana were dewatered to satisfy
prior rights.6' Appropriative water rights are theoretically the opposite of riparian
rights: there need be no relationship between the source of water and the locus
of use.62 Los Angeles, for example, enjoys water appropriated from the Colorado
and Owens Rivers hundreds of miles from the city. Los Angeles effectively
foreclosed growth in the Owens Valley watershed because of its diversions and
has done substantial environmental damage that is now being redressed.63 Prior
appropriation is therefore a use-based rather than land-based system of
property rights. The system was developed in the mining camps of California to
56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 42-211 (1) (1996) (stating that the Department of Water
Resources must determine planning horizon for municipal retention of water rights).
57. SeeCAL.WATERCODE§ 10911(a).
58. See Stanislaus Natural Heritage Project v. County of Stanislaus, 48 Cal. App. 4th
182 (5th Dist. 1996).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 185. 1 have addressed these issues in more detail in, A. Dan Tarlock &
Sarah Bates Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water Law: From Urban Oases to
Archipelagos, 5 HAsTINGS WEsr-NorHwEST I. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 182 (1999).
61. See Brian Morris, When Rivers Run Dry Under a Big Sky: Balancing Agricultural and
Recreational Claims to Scarce Water Resources in Montana and the American West, II STANFORD ENvrL.
L.J. 259, 276 (1992).
62. See Califomia-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142(1935).
63. See generally Tarlock & Bates, supra note 60.
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allocate water for placer mining. 64 It spread throughout the West because it was
thought to promote irrigation economies.
Appropriate rights are not tied to the locus of the use of the water. They
apply to direct flow diversions and to the storage of water for subsequent
release. Water can be used any place to which it can be transported within a
state.6 A water right is perfected by diverting water and applying it to a
beneficial use. Rights are allocated by priority. In times of shortage, there is no
pro rata curtailment. Junior rights must cut back so that senior right holders will
obtain the full amount of their rights. Holders of senior rights are entitled to
take the full amount of their rights regardless of the comparative efficiencies of
junior and senior uses. These rules were generously applied to cities. The
growing communities doctrine, for example, allowed cities to appropriate water
to meet the anticipated future capacity of its system.66 In addition, most western
states have also applied the doctrine of prior appropriation to groundwater, but
the large pumping states of California, Nebraska and Texas have not.
Prior appropriation does have some riparian elements that support watershed
protection.67 For example, junior appropriators have vested rights to return flows,'
and therefore stream systems enjoy de facto, but unsecure, minimum flow levels. A
senior right holder may generally only transfer the amount of water actually
consumed in order to protect downstream users. Some states have enacted area of
origin protection statutes.6 9 However, as the West turns to "water marketing," large
scale permanent or temporary transfers, to reallocate water from agricultural to
urban and environmental uses,7" return flows are diminishing. Recent droughts in
the western United States have exposed substantial fish population and riparian
64. See People v. Shirokow, 6 Cal. 3d 301,307-08 (1980).
65. Ironically, many states have imposed statutes that prohibit or restrict the export
of water across state lines. Export prohibitions are unconstitutional discrimination against
interstate commerce, but statutes that prefer in to out-of-state users may be constitutional.
See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
66. However, the Washington Supreme Court has limited the reach of this doctrine.
The Court held that the measure of the water right is the actual application to beneficial use
rather than the capacity of a private municipal water system. See State Dep't of Ecology v.
Theodoratus, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998). The Court left open the issue of whether the holding
applies to municipal water suppliers. See id. The growing communities doctrine was strongly
endorsed in the dissenting opinion. See id. at 1257-58 (Sanders, 1., dissenting).
67. See A. Din Tarlock, The West Returns to Riparianism, 27 WATER REsouRcEs RESEARCH
987(1991).
68. See McDonalds v. Bear River and Auburn Water & Mining Co., 12 Cal. 220 (1859).
69. See generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in
Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 527 (1986).
70. See NATIONAL RESOURCE COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WESr: EFFICIENCY, EourrY
ANDTHE ENVIRONMENT (1992).
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vegetation to extreme stresses from the prior appropriation doctrine. A number of
states have tried to address this problem by recognizing various forms of instream
flow rights to sustain fish populations in designated rivers. Initially, the law of prior
appropriation did not recognize rights unless there was a diversion, but most
western states now have instream flow protection programs that permit states to
reserve or appropriate water for this use."' The public trust doctrine can also
promote integrated watershed management by requiring the preservation of
minimum flows necessary to sustain local fish populations. In brief, the doctrine
posits that states hold navigable waters in trust for an expanding compass of public
uses that include watershed and environmental protection.72 A landmark Califomia
decision held that vested appropriative rights are subject to the public trust.7 3 As a
result, the right holder, the City of Los Angeles, had to cut back on diversions from
the tributaries to a lake on the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada because lower lake
levels threatened the stability of Mono Lake's fragile ecosystem,.4
3. Native American and Federal Public Land Rights
Native American tribes have a special class of water rights that adhere to
treaty and executive order reservations and these rights may be used to promote
watershed conservation. 5 The distinguishing feature of all aboriginal peoples is
that their identity is tied to a specific geographic location. Thus, these group
rights are more strongly tied to the watershed of origin and could be the basis
for the integration of water and land use on Indian reservations. Indian
reservations are the remnants of the pre-European society that existed in North
America before its discovery and conquest. These reservations sometimes are
the true aboriginal homelands and, in other cases, they represent wastelands on
which tribes were resettled in the nineteenth century. All reservations may claim
implied federal reserved Indian water rights to support reservation uses because
they are pre-existing or aboriginal rights reserved by the treaty creating the
reservation or they were granted by the federal government, as owner of all
public lands including Indian reservations. 6
71. See generally NATuRAL REsouRcEs LAw CENTER, INsTREAM FLOw PROTECrnON IN THE WEST
(Lawrence I. MacDonnell & Terese A. Rice eds., 1993).
72. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 259-60 (1971).
73. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 658 P.2d 709
(Cal. 1983), cert. Denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). See also Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public
Trust: Text, Near-Text, and Context, 27 ARIz. ST. L.I. 1155 (1995).
74. See National Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 712 (Cal. 1983).
75. See generally Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
76. The proposition, much despised among Native Americans today, that Indian
tribes have no title against the federal government because the Indians only occupied,
rather than possessed, the land was established in Johnson v. M'lntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
West s Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter'2008
The Supreme Court first recognized tribal water rights in the case of Winters
v. United States. The Supreme Court held that the tribe had superior rights to
state appropriators because tribal rights date from the creation of the
reservation. The Court reasoned that reservations were set aside to transform
Indians into settled irrigators and that the rights were necessary to fulfill
Congress' "civilizing" mission . Tribal water rights have characteristics of both
appropriative and riparian rights and are superior to most state created-rights.
Winters rights are "quasi-riparian" because the right is based on land ownership,
not, as in the case with appropriate rights, on the application of water to
beneficial use. But, they are also appropriative because the right has a priority
date; the usual priority date is the date of the creation of the reservation.79 Since
most reservations were created to clear the way for non-Indian settlement, this
date is sufficient to give the tribe a right superior to most state-created rights.
True aboriginal rights based on immemorial practices would, of course, be
superior to any state-created rights.
Until the 1960s, tribal rights were asserted by the federal government
under its trust responsibility. As a result, Winters rights were generally only
claimed to support existing or planned tribal irrigation needs, and were thus
minimal since federal irrigation funding lagged far behind non-Indian subsidies.
Winters rights are now asserted directly by the tribes and tribal-state tensions
have risen. Tribes assert rights to large amounts of water long allocated by state
law, to the use of water for irrigation and non-irrigation purposes, and to the
right to lease the water for non-reservation uses. In 1963, the Supreme Court
held that the right entitled the tribes to all water necessary to irrigate the
"practicable irrigable acreage" on the reservation.w This standard requires that
the land be (1) capable of irrigation, and (2) at a reasonable cost.8 Practicable
irrigable acreage gives many tribes large blocks of paper water rights.
77. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
78. See id. at 576.
79. See Judith V. Royster, A Primer on Indian Water Rights: More Questions Than Answers, 30
TuLSA L.J. 61(1994).
80. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
81. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Hom River System,
753 P.2d 165 (Wyo. 1988), affd sub. nom. Wyoming v. United States, 492 U.S. 496 (1989). Arizona
has rejected this narrow reading of Winters. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to the Use of
Water in the Gila River System and Source, 989 P.2d 739 (Ariz. 1999) (holding that federal reserved
rights apply to groundwater beneath Indian reservations and other federal lands such as national
parks, monuments, wildlife preserves and military bases). Indian tribes and federal land managers
may claim reserved rights in unappropriated waters beneath the land. The non-subflow pumpers
are subject only to the limitations of the reasonable use rule because the Court had previously
held that the law of prior appropriation applies only to the waters of surface streams and their
subflow. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to the Use of Water in the Gila River System
and Source, 857 P.2d 1236 (Ariz. 1993). However, the Court rejected the distinction as artificial and
1075
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Many tribes want to use water for non-consumptive, non-irrigation uses
and these uses can be the foundation for reservation watershed protection and
restoration strategies. Courts have also recognized Winters rights for instream
flows and fisheries,82 but the idea has not been universally accepted. The
Wyoming Supreme Court held that Winters does not apply to either groundwater
or to the use of water for fisheries maintenance.83 .Winters rights are also a source
of off-reservation transfers and thus could frustrate watershed restoration or
protection efforts. However, the legal power of tribes to transfer water remains
disputed.' The power to lease to non-Indians is often asserted but has never
been directly judicially sanctioned. The transfer to tribal land and probably
water requires congressional consent under the Nonintercourse Act of 1790 and
this may apply to leases as well as permanent title transfers.8 '
Indian tribes may also protect their reservations against upstream
pollution in the watershed. Section 505 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") allows
tribes to adopt more stringent water quality standards than those required by
the federal EPA or the state in which the reservation is located.86 Rio Grande
River Pueblo, located below the city of Albuquerque, adopted a more stringent
sewage discharge standard for arsenic than required by the state of New Mexico
by classifying its portion of the river for ceremonial use.87 Federal courts have
held that tribes have the same power as states to adopt more stringent water
quality standards and thus EPA has the authority under section 510 of the CWA
to approve these standards.'
held that under federal law surface and groundwater are integral parts of the hydrologic cycle. See
989 P.2d at 748.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1252 (1983).
83. See In re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d at 174.
84. Western states have long argued that tribal reserved rights were recognized solely
for the purpose of transforming nomadic into pastoral people and thus they cannot only be
used for on-reservation irrigation. As Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States
confront the special problems of defining rights to protect unassimilated aboriginal groups
and give them a fighting chance of survival, the nature of aboriginal rights must be clearly
confronted. Canada, for example, limits aboriginal rights to pre-European practices. See A.
Dan Tarlock, Can Cowboys Become Indians: Protecting Western Communities as Endangered Cultural
Remnants, 31, ARiz. ST. L.I. 539, 578 (1999).
85. See Royster, supra note 79, at 82-83.
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
87. See City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733 (D.N.M. 1993), affd, 97 F.3d
415 (10th Cir. 1996).
88. See id.; see also Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
275(1998).
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The federal government may also assert reserved rights to carry out the
water-related purposes of public land withdrawn for a water-related use, but the
Supreme Court has effectively refused to allow the doctrine to be used for
watershed protection. 9 Federal land management agencies have tried to use
these rights to protect riverine stream corridors in national forests and grazing
lands, but the Supreme Court has basically rejected the use of federal rights for
this purpose except for national parks and monuments;' thus, the doctrine plays
a minimal role in watershed conservation. Most non-Indian reserved rights claims
are based on the implied rather than the express intent of Congress in
withdrawing public land from entry. In a case denying reserved rights for national
forests, the Court developed a high threshold test: (1) there must be strong
evidence of implied intent, (2) the water must be for the primary not secondary
purpose of the reservation, and (3) the right is limited to the minimum amount of
water necessary to carry out the purpose of the withdrawal.9'
4. Regulatory Water Rights
Federal environmental mandates are a potential, but inconsistent, source
of watershed protection because they allow the federal government to protect
both the quantity and quality of the stream flows. The protection of biodiversity
in river corridors requires the recognition of rights to some level of minimum
flow. In addition to state laws that create instream flow rights, the federal
government has the power to mandate conservation flows through the assertion
of federal regulatory water rights. Regulatory water rights are de facto rather
than de jure proprietary rights which arise because of federal and state
regulatory programs. Regulatory property rights refer to federal programs which
require flow releases to fulfill the regulatory mandate but which may be
inconsistent with state water law. The three most important federal programs
that can supercede state water law are sections 401 and 404 of the CWA92 and
the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA). 93 Prior to the 1970s, the federal
government generally asserted only proprietary water rights.
Programs such as the Federal Power Act of 1920,94 CWA and ESA, have the
potential to require that large quantities of water be released from federal
reservoirs or left in streams to fulfill the federal program objectives. These
89. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978). The Idaho Supreme Court
has held that the Wildemess Act is an implied reservation of all unappropriated waters in
the wilderness watershed, but it is not certain the opinion will stand in the face of intense
water user opposition. In re SRBA, No. 39576, slip op. (Idaho, Oct. 1, 1999), reh'g granted.
90. See id. at 707.
91. See id. At 702.
92. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1344.
93. 16U.S.C.§ 1531.
94. 16 U.S.C. § 729.
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decisions may preempt state water allocation law and thus often driven current
watershed protection efforts. For example, ESA applies to both new and existing
federal water projects and to federally licensed. projects.95 Section 401 of the
CWA96 is another source of new regulatory rights that gives the states increased
power to protect their watersheds from the adverse water-quality related effects
of federally licensed projects. The section requires state certification that a
federal facility or licensed facility compiles with state water quality standards.97
A 1994. United States Supreme Court decision holds that a state may refuse to
certify a hydroelectric facility because the proposed minimum flow schedules
were inadequate to meet the state's anti-degradation standard." The Court
refused to confine state certification to chemical pollution, calling the
distinction between water quantity and quality "artificial."'"9
The effect on vested state water rights remains unclear but sufficient
uncertainty exists for states and private parties to seek altematives, such as
voluntary watershed restoration, to the regulatory programs. In 1982, ESA was
reauthorized without carving out a special exception for western water rights,"0 and
it has been interpreted to allow the federal government to deny the necessary
federal permits to enjoy state water rights,'0 ' to require that the federal government
dedicate previously dedicated reservoir blocks to the protection of endangered
species, °2 and to enjoin state water rights holders from continuing diversions that
harmed endangered species.' °3 State regulatory water rights may exist as well as
similar statutes or under assertions of the "public trust."'1
0 4
Watershed protection has also been enhanced by the impact of pollution
abatement programs. Most point source discharges have been substantially
reduced, and we are now just beginning to see the secondary impacts on land
use that cleaner water is producing. For example, the application of the CWA to
New York's Hudson River has revived fisheries in it through the elimination of
conventional and toxic pollution. PCB problems remain, although the risks that
this level of PCB exposure presents are highly uncertain.' 5 Communities along
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1535.
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1341.
97. 16U.S.C. § 1344.
98. See PUD No. I of JeffersonCountyv.Washington Dept of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700(1994).
99. See id. at 706.
100. See Pub. L. 97-304 (1982).
101. See Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 (1 Oth Cir. 1985).
102. See Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
103. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation District, 788 F. Supp. I126(E. D.Cal. 1992).
104. See Weber, supra note 73, at 1168.
105. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Study Finds little Risks from PCBs, N. Y. IMES, Mar. 10,
1999, at A12 (reporting that workers exposed to PCBs did not have significantly higher
incidence of cancer compared to non-exposed groups).
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the river are reorienting themselves to the river, which had been dedicated to
industrial use and transportation, and are now treating the river as an ecological
system and valuable amenity.'" The revival of the Hudson has also stimulated a
greater sense of river-centered regionalism among the riparian communities.'7
5. International Law
International law might serve as a model to integrate land and water use,
but the concept has been strongly resisted by the international community. First,
the law's historic function has been to set the ground rules for comprehensive
river basin development and to promote treaties among riparian states for the
allocation of large rivers. "08 In recent years, draft water law rules have added
important environmental protection mandates, but it is very difficult to promote
the protection of the ecological integrity of river systems because protection is not
a conventional water use. Flood plain and wetland protection are largely excluded
from these new rules which are focused on pollution prevention.
International water law is a channel-based, not watershed- or ecosystem-based,
legal regime, and this focus is inherently biased toward development and against
ecosystem protection. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-
Navigational Uses of International Waters,'09 prepared by the International Law
Commission of the United Nations and opened for signature in 1997, applies to
international watercourses and not river systems. The term "watercourse" is narrowly
defined in the Convention as "a system of surface and undergroundwaters constituting
by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and flowing into a common
terminus.""° The definition is progressive because it includes connected groundwater.
However, excluded from the rules are land in the watershed and probably confined
aquifers, so the law does not promote environmental management. Ultimately, this is
a step backward from previous definitions of international river systems. Land use
practices, such as dear cutting timber, effectively remain outside of any international
restraints. The exploiting nation's legal regime remains the controlling regulatory
authority."' Domestic and international legal regimes maintain a persistent but
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. See . Dan Tarlock, International Water Law and the Protection of River System Ecosystem
Integrity, 10 BYU J. PUBL. 181 (1996).
109. See 36 I.L.M. 700(1997).
110. Id. at704.
111. This statement could be contested in light of the nascent international legal
regime to conserve biological diversity. See PHILIPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, Ch. 10 (1995).
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artificial separation of rivers from the flood plains"2 and wetlands which influence
them (and which they influence) to prevent water use rules-premised on the need to
share a common resource-from becoming a basis for land use regulation." 3 Further,
under some interpretations of equitable apportionment, traditional practices such as
the use of floodwaters may be inefficient and impose a duty on a riparian state to
conserve water for the benefit of downstream states. Waste counts against a state in
the balancing test because conservation has traditionally meant that water should be
efficiently consumed.'
Environmental factors play a secondary role, although the Convention has
made commendable efforts to incorporate them into international water law. The
Convention contains several innovative environmental protection rules. For
example, Article 20 requires that states protect the ecosystems of international
watercourses,"' and Article 22 requires a state to take all measures necessary to
prevent the introduction of alien species into a river system if the species "may have
effects detrimental to the ecosystem of the watercourse.""6 This standard comes
from the objections that Canada lodged to the United States Garrison diversion in
North Dakota.'" However, the fact remains that the protection of a river system's
ecological integrity remains secondary to the promotion of development.
Ill. The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: A Case Study in Non-Integration
The difficulty of integrating river corridor or watershed protection with
water use and management is illustrated by the history of the implementation
112. Human actions that dampen or eliminate natural disturbances are likely to be a
threat to biodiversity in many kinds of environments. For example, many riparian plant
species such as cottonwoods become established after floods, which create new deposits of
bare silt and gravel where seedlings can establish. Eliminating periodic flooding by building
dams may prevent regeneration of many species and drastically alter riparian plant
communities. See REED E. Noss & ALLEN Y. COOPERIDER, SAVING NATURES LEGACY: PRcrECTING
AND RESrORING BIODIVESITY 95 (1994). See generally Thayer Schudder, The Need and Justification for
Maintaining Transboundary Flood Regimes: The Africa Case, 31 NAT. RESOURCES I. 75 (1991).
113. See Ludwick A. Teclaff, Treaty Practices Relating to Transboundary Flooding, 31 NAT.
RESOURCES 1. 109 (1991) (surveying the extremely limited international legal recognition of
the values of flood cycles).
114. Article 5(e) indudes "conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the
water resource and the cost measures taken to that effect" and Article 5 mandates that intemational
watercourses be "used and developed ... with a view toward obtaining optimal utilization therefrom
consistent with adequate protection of thewatercourse." 36 I.L.M. 710.
115. See36I.L.M.710.
116. Id.
117. See Charles M. Carvell, The North Dakota Garrison Diversion Project'and international
Environmental Law, 60 N.D. L. REv. 603 (1984).
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of the United States Wild and Scenic Rivers Act ("WSRA")."' The WSRA could be,
but is not, a model watershed. protection act." 9 In 1968, Congress passed the
WSRA to recognize and preserve free-flowing rivers with "outstandingly
remarkable scenic, recreational, geologic, fish and wildlife, historic, cultural or
other similar values.' 2 The WSRA has effectively stopped many water projects
on large rivers,' 2' but it has been less effective at controlling incompatible
corridor land uses and upstream watershed degradation. The primary problem
with the WSRA is the lack of integration of corridor and watershed management
with the protection of rivers. From 1965 to 1968, the focus on river protection
broadened from prohibiting dam building to the inclusion of river
management.'22 However, the WSRA did not create a strong corridor
management program.
There is some statutory basis for managing publicly-owned land to
promote biodiversity.'23 However, few rivers have a single landowner along the
entire river, much less within the whole watershed, and most rivers have a
patchwork of public and private owners. In the absence of land use regulation,
privately-owned land along WSRA-designated rivers is at risk for activities which
increase erosion and pollution, harming the values for which the river was
preserved. Land development along rivers ranks as the greatest concern to
public interest groups interested in designating a river under the WSRA or
managing already-designated rivers.
The subordination of flow protection to corridor management is an
important element missing from current biodiversity and watershed protection
programs. Riparian or streamside systems are exceptionally rich, "contributing
disproportionately to biological diversity."'24 Not surprisingly, the WSRA works
best when the rivers are located on public lands. The designation to protect
watersheds of rivers flowing through private lands has been controversial
because landowners fear condemnation. This fear successfully blocked inclusion
of the Cacapon and Shenandoah rivers in West Virginia. In response to
vociferous opposition to the use of the power of eminent domain, the WSRA
encourages easements on privately owned land rather than outright
118. 16us.c.§1271.
119. This section is drawn from Carolyn Raffensperger & A. Dan Tarlock, The Wild and
Scenic Rivers Act at 25: The Need fora New Focus, 4 RIVERs 81, 83 (1993).
120. 16U.S.C.§ 1271.
121. See I6U.S.C. § 1278(a).
122. Congress established the WSRA in order to complement "the national policy of
dam and other construction." id.
123. See Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructing a Law of Ecosystem
Management, 65 U. CoLO. L. REv. 293, 297, (1994).
124. Reed Noss, What Can Wilderness Do for Biodiversity?, I WILD EARTH 51, 66 (1991).
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acquisition.'25 Condemnation is prohibited if more than half of the river corridor
is already in public ownership, or where a local zoning ordinance conforms to
the purposes of the Act. 26 These provisions limit the ability of managing
agencies to procure entire watersheds for protection. Rivers brought into the
system through state action have a further limitation: management (except for
federally-owned lands) cannot be at the expense of the federal government.
27
However, land can be acquired through the Land and Water Conservation Act of
1965, which is exempt from the ban on federal dollars.2
Public land management creates problems even when agencies have the
power to integrate land and water management. Public land management has
never been unified.. Agencies generally have pursued separate missions with
little inter-agency coordination. Federal agency cooperation is gradually taking
shape under pressure from environmental protection mandates and citizen
watershed groups. Fragmented public land management can frustrate river,
corridor and watershed protection on wild and scenic rivers. The system is an
orphan within the federal government with no strong advocates among the
federal land management agencies. The result is a disjointed program with little
money and little vision. The agencies that are to work together managing
designated rivers, the Departments of Interior and Agriculture, have long had a
fractious relationship. These inter-agency tensions have resulted in rivers
qualified for inclusion but dedicated as recreation and not wild rivers, such as
the Little Miami in Ohio.
An additional problem in assigning the management of WSRA-designated
rivers to these agencies is that they traditionally have multiple-use mandates,
whereas the WSRA is a single-purpose mandate designed to protect rivers with
remarkable characteristics. Having the Department of Agriculture manage a wild
river flowing through a national forest where there is extensive logging can
result in conflict between the agency's mandate to promote multi-uses in the
forest and the protection of the river from erosion associated with logging. To
the extent that a river could be protected for outstanding fish or wildlife, riverine
biodiversity may be compromised by an agency sacrificing the river to its multi-
use land management mandate.'29
Fragmentation among the federal land management agencies is a major
impediment to the integration of land use controls and water values. No single
federal agency has jurisdiction over the system, and either states or the federal
government can manage component rivers. A single river can be managed
125. See 16u.S.C.§ 1285.
126. See id.
127. See 16 U.S.C. § 1273.
128. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4.
129. See, e.g., Deschutes River Landowners Committee, 136 INTERIOR BOARD LAND
APPEALs 105 (1996) (stating that the Bureau of Land Management has discretion to increase
public access to a wild and scenic river).
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segment by segment by different federal, state or tribal agencies depending on
the management or ownership of the land through which it flows. This makes
consistent management of an entire watershed difficult at best. The WSRA itself
provides for different managers depending on which agency had prior
jurisdiction over the river.3 ' Thus, state agencies or the federal Departments of
Interior or Agriculture can all have jurisdiction over wild and scenic rivers
depending upon the prior classification of the corridor. State agencies
administer river segments that came into the system through state action, the
Department of Agriculture administers rivers that are contained in National
Forests, and the Department of Interior manages remaining rivers.
The rejection of the Smith River in Northern California illustrates this
problem."' The Secretary of the Interior rejected designation of 2760 miles of
the Smith River as a wild and scenic river because it would conflict with logging in
the Six Rivers National Forest.'3 2 Under United States public land laws, the Forest
Service, housed in the Department of Agriculture, not Interior, has a strong timber
production mandate,'33 although the Service is a recent convert to watershed
protection. Moreover, the seventy-six miles that were included were designated as
recreational, rather than wild, so that logging and mining could continue.'34 The
irony is that of all California rivers proposed for inclusion, only the Smith was
undammed its entire length. The Smith was later protected as a National
Recreation Area, a Congressional designation outside of the WSRA emphasizing
recreation and restricting logging.'35 The WSRA recognizes that such conflicts may
occur and specifies that for rivers running through wilderness areas, national parks
or national wildlife refuges, the more restrictive law governs management of the
rivers. "'36 It may be presumed that the more environmental or preservationist law is
the more restrictive. In the face of conflicting laws or management practices this
clause can be used to enhance biodiversity.
Timber harvesting, mining, logging, grazing and recreation create acute
problems for river quality and watershed integrity. These activities are permitted
along designated rivers, but they can be managed under a provision of the
130. See 16 U.S.C. § 1273(a).
131. See Sally K. Fairfax every time al., Federalism and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act: Now
You See It, Now You Don't, 59 WASH. L. REv. 417, 424 (1984).
132. See id. at 444.
133. Environmentalists have mounted powerful arguments that in the nineteenth
century, the protection of watersheds was one of the primary purposes for which national
forests were established. See George C. Coggins, Watershed as a Public Natural resource on Federal
Lands, I VA. ENvrL. L.J. 1 (1991); Charles F. Wilkinson & H. Michael Anderson, Land and
Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REv. 1, 202-204 (1985).
134. SeeFairfaxetal.,supra note 131,at 444.
135. See PALMER, supra note 20, at 44.
136. SeeI6U.S.C.§1281.
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WSRA which specifies that "[elach component of the national wild and scenic
rivers system shall be administered in such a manner as to protect and enhance
the values which caused it to be included in said system.'' 37 Management plans
may specify varying degrees of protection and development based on the
special attributes of the area and on what designation a river receives. However,
the directive to enhance the values which caused it to be included in the system
offers a unique opportunity to restore biodiversity in a protected river.
Enhancing and restoring river quality stands in marked contrast to activities
such as mining and logging which degrade river quality. The WSRA recognizes
the special harm that mining can do to a river by prohibiting the activity within
one-quarter mile of the banks of a wild river. 38 Mining activity can continue on
recreational rivers and is supposedly regulated by the managing agency. 3 9 While
mining is not the major threat that dams were to the entire system, it has
caused confrontations and environmental problems across the country. Gold
and gravel mining, in particular, have posed particular harm to rivers due to the
instream processes required for the mining operation.
Timber harvesting and grazing are two of the most environmentally
damaging activities that take place along river corridors. Clear-cutting on
erodible lands can lead to massive siltation and turbidity of the water with a
consequent loss of biodiversity. Grazing causes erosion and siltation. Congress
directed managing agencies that "[plarticular attention shall be given to
scheduled timber harvests ... And similar activities that might be contrary to
the purposes of [the WSRAI."' 40 This limit is particularly important in Oregon, a
prime logging state that also has over 1600 miles of rivers in the wild and scenic
river system. 4 ' It is projected that river designation will reduce the annual
allowable timber sale on public land by seven million board feet.' 2 Additionally,
the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")" 41 is a potential tool for
integration because it can be used as the basis to invalidate management plans
that are internally inconsistent with the protection of a wild and scenic river.1
4
137. Id.
138. See 16 U.S.C. §I280(a).
139. See id.
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1283(a).
141. See PALMER, supra note 20, at 252.
142. See id.
143. 42 U:S.C.§4321.
144. Se Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Green, 953 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Or. 1997) (holding
NEPA may apply to on going management activities when the agency's duties change as the result
of the designation of a wild and scenic river). In 1988, Congress designated the Donner und Blitzen
(Thunder and Lightening) River in Oregon as a wild river underthe WSRA See 16 U.S.C. § 1274(a)(74).
Most of the river flows through public lands administered by the Bureaucracy of Land Management
("BLM"). BLM prepared the required management plan with the help of the Nature Conservancy. See
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IV. Land Use Controls and the Constitutional Protection of Property
Many of the major causes of watershed degradation stem from
unsustainable land uses within the watershed. With minor exceptions, United
States land law has always promoted the settlement and intensive development
of land.4 ' In addition, the law frustrates integration by allocating land and water
by two different property rights regimes. One, water, is premised on shared, semi-
exclusive property rights, while the other, land, is premised on exclusive property
rights. Both these regimes were regulated to minimize some of the obvious social
costs of the exercise of private rights. However, this dual regulation frustrates
integrated watershed management because the United States, like most
countries, has created a fragmented maze of regulatory and planning authorities
to deal with land and water separately. Thus, the fundamental but artificial
dichotomy between land and water makes it difficult to integrate land and water
management through existing land use and environmental regulatory regimes.46
Formal integrated planning, where it is practiced, cannot compensate for
fragmented and incomplete regulatory authority. Land use planning and
regulatory regimes often exclude the watershed and riparian impacts of the use of
Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 953 F. Supp. at 1137. The Nature Conservancy report recommended that
grazing be stopped along the entire river because parts of the ecosystem had been degraded by it.
See id. However, BLM relied on a subsequent statement of the biologist who authored the report that
livestock grazing should be banned in the canyon areas of the river, where topography and fences
largely exclude it, but that a 'Well-crafted" allotment management plan be implemented in flatter
areas. See id. at 1138. BLM adopted a river management plan after it issued an environmental
assessment, which did not require the exdusion of cattle from any new part of the river. See id. The
plaintiff disagreed with the plan because it failed to protect and restore "a very threatened ecosystem
type." Id. at 1139. ONDA argued that the plan required the preparation of a full EIS. See Id. at 1146.
BLM countered with the argument that an EIS is not required for the continuation of the status quo.
See Id. at 1147. The court held that an EIS was required because the BLM was not simply continuing a
prior management activity. See Id. "Once the Donner und Blitzen became a component of the WSRA
system, intervening duties were imposed on the agency's decision-making process with respect to
management activities." Id. See also GEORGE C. CoGGINs & ROBERT L. GUcKSMAN, PUBuc NATURAL
REsouRcEs L.Aw IOG.04111-121 (1993).
145. See Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, Responsibility, Opportunity, 24
ENVTL. L. 1139, 1467-72 (1994). Land development generally has not respected hydrologic
limitations. For a summary of the environmental consequences of the development of
urban oases in the westem United States, see BEAuMONT, supra note 13, at 116-125,402-448.
146. See generally Adler, supra note 16. For an excellent case study of these problems in
New South Wales, Australia, see ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENDER'S OFFICE, INLAND RIvERS: STRATEGIES
FOR ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT (1994).
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rivers. Until very recently, water users had no duty to consider the land use
implications of the exercise of their rights.
47
The single largest legal barrier to the protection of river corridors is the
possibility that the necessary intensive regulation will be found to be an
unconstitutional taking of private property without due process of law, as
prohibited by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. River
corridor protection is both an example of sensitive lands protection and an
important component of biodiversity protection; however, this protection is
difficult to accomplish because it requires intrusive land use controls.4 All land
use regulation, especially the protection of sensitive lands, disturbs political
and legal expectations of easy and rapid land conversion. Rapid development is
the cardinal value throughout the world, regardless of the system of
government. Conversion is inherent in market systems because all resources,
including land, are commodities to be exploited by development or transfer. In
the United States, the expectation of the "right to convert" is protected by the
constitutional guarantee that property will not be "taken" without just
compensation.49 Land is a form of exclusive private property, and the United
States Supreme Court has recently pronounced that land is the highest form of
private property'50 and has displayed increasing hostility to the idea that the
state can regulate the use of land to protect biodiversity.
The hostility to biodiversity protection is captured in the Supreme, Court's
1992 decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.'5' Lucas held that a state
beachfront setback line imposed to protect property from erosion was an
unconstitutional taking of the owner's property because it virtually destroyed the
development value of the lot. The most far-reaching aspect of the opinion is the
suggestion that a regulation that has a substantial economic impact may only be
justified if the limitation inheres "in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place on land
ownership." '52 Lucas did, however, recognize that a property owner cannot claim that
a govemment regulation constitutes a taking if the regulation codifies "background
147. See infra notes 181-89 and accompanying text.
148. Reviewing a moratorium on land development in a municipal watershed, a court
noted that "It he Legislature is still wrestling with the problem of watershed protection. The issue
is politically sensitive because it pits a matter of general concern (protection of watershed land
and water sources) against both the property rights of watershed owners and the taxing interests
of municipal entities .... Thus, the fact that no easy resolution has occurred is neither a surprise
nor a signal that the moratorium was meant to expire." City of Newark V. Township of Hardyston,
667 A.2d 193,198 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 1995).
149. U.S. CONsr. Amend. V.
150. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
151.. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
152. Id. at 1029.
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principles of nuisance and property law," although it is clear that Justice Scalia did
not intend it as a widely available justification for severe land use regulations.'"
Common law-based background limitations reflect the idea that property
is a legal construct, which has historically reflected both public and private
interests.' These background limitations can support more intensive regulation
of resources such as wetlands that have long been subject to judicial and
administrative control.'" Furthermore, a federalism reading of the Lucas
qualification would afford substantial deference to state law to define the
background conditions'56 and would support a less uni-dimensional conception
of property than is currently reflected in the Supreme Court jurisprudence.'57 A
federalism approach to the definition of property rights would not compel the
adoption of. an ecological concept of property, or the incorporation of an
ecosystem support limitation into the right,' but it would permit states to
integrate this approach into takings law.'59
Despite the Lucas opinion, two contradictory trends are taking place in
United States takings law. The first seeks to codify the restrictive tests of Lucas
and impose extra-constitutional compensation burdens on states. In effect,
states would have to pay to protect the environment. To that end, several states
153. Id. at 1029-30. See generally Louise Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 89 (1998).
154. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modem Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1252, 1281 (1996).
155. Professor Fred Bosselman has recently traced the common law roots of
wetlands regulation. See Fred Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands of Common
Law, 15 STAN. ENVrL. L.J. 247 (1996).
156. Professor Frank 1. Michelman has lucidly pointed out the tension in Lucas between
the desire to expand the scope of regulatory takings and the Court's respect for "our federalism."
See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and judicial
Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 301 (1993). See also Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, The
Individual and Society: Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 53 MD. L. REV. 162 (1993).
157. The argument that no single "land ethic" is adequate to define property for Fifth
Amendment purposes is brilliantly developed in Fred Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform,
Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENvit,. L. 1439 (1994). Also see the exchange between Professors
Richard Epstein and Frank Michelman. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The
Legacy of Pruneyard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 21 (1997); Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline
and Restituion for Lost Commons: A Reply to Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 57 (1997).
158. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433 (1993) (sketching a concept of property as a
usufruct rather than an exclusive right to maximization exploitation). See also Eric T.
Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA L. REV. 77 (1995).
159. See generally Michelnan, supra note 156.
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have passed property rights legislation."w Such legislation either requires some
form of property rights impact assessment, modeled on environmental impact
assessment, or contains a substantive standard-beyond that required by
federal and state constitutions-to determine when a landowner is entitled to
compensation. The Florida Property Rights Act entitles an owner to
compensation if a regulation inordinately burdens his land or he "bears
permanently a disproportionate share of a burden imposed for the good of the
public, which in fairness should be borne by the public at large."'
The counter-trend seeks to protect biologically sensitive lands such as
wetlands and endangered species habitats either by preventing development, by
allowing development in return for the dedication of land or the payment of fees
to mitigate the adverse effects of the project, or by providing substitute forms of
compensation. 62 State courts have shown considerable support for these efforts
either by holding that the right to create an environmental hazard is not
constitutionally protected or by supporting mitigation schemes. For example,
Colorado has held that the enforcement of state radiation control regulations
against a mill site with uranium tailings was not taking because no investment-
backed expectations were frustrated.'63 "The Mill was 'on notice' that the
radioactive materials present on the property were dangerous and highly
regulated at both the state and federal level as was the use of the property
160. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-704 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-102, 75-1-103,
75-1-201 (1999); TENN. CODEANN. § 12-1-201 (1999).
161. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 70,00 1(3)(e) (West 1995). See also TEx. Gov. CODE ANN. § 2007
(West 1999).
162. State wetland regulation is analyzed in W[LuAMWANT, THE LAW OF WELAND REGULAON
ch. 13 (1989). K&K Construcion Co. v. Department of Natural Resourc is an important illustration of state
laws which limit the development of water-related property. 575 N. W. 2d 531 (Mich. 1998). A
developer applied for permission to develop an 89-acre tract which was divided into four parcels.
Parcel I contained 51 acres, 27 of which were wetlands. Parcel 2 contained 16 acres and a small
amount of wetlands. Parcel 3 contained 9.34 acres and Parcel 4 contained 3.4 acres; no wetlands
existed on these two parcels. After a permit denial, the developer filed a taking action and the lower
court held that the denominator was Parcel 1. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, and held that
"it is neither realistic nor fair to consider only Parcel I for purposes of taking analysis" because the
parcels were contiguous, although the court remanded for a factual finding on one parcel. Id. at 536
(citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)). The court found
that there was no categorical Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council taking because the developer could
develop the upland portion of Parcel I and all of parcels 2 and 4. Thus, the plaintiffs must prove that a
taking occurred under the Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York balancing formula. 438 U.S.
104 (1978). Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999), cert, deniad, 68 U.S.L.W. 3367 (U.S.
April 3, 2000), holds that wetland investors who purchase with knowledge of the federal regulatory
structure have no investment-backed expectations when a permit is denied to protect an
endangered species.
163. See Colorado Dep't of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994).
1088
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
itself."6  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has remanded a takings
claim to determine if a city can prevent the development of littoral land flooded
by a public waterbody, under the Lucas pre-existing title limitation doctrine.'
Iowa used a similar analysis to hold that state legislation protecting Indian
mounds on private property precluded a takings claim."6 Nevada has held that
regulatory delays in development approvals in the Lake Tahoe Basin are not a
taking because the developer had notice of a complex regulatory process and
the protection of the Tahoe Basin would benefit the developer when his
property was granted development approval.'67
Many jurisdictions are experimenting with substitute forms of
compensation for landowners whose property is subject to regulation.
Transferable development rights ("TDRs"), originally developed to preserve
urban landmarks, but more recently extended to the preservation of
environmentally sensitive land, are the most common form of substitute. A
landowner is assigned rights to develop which cannot be used on sensitive land
but can be transferred to other land or sold to other developers. The basic idea
is to set the level of development entitlements for an area, such as a watershed,
and then allow an owner to detach a number of units from the land, usually in
return for leaving it undeveloped, and to relocate or anchor those units on
another tract.' 8 A recent extension of the idea contemplates the creation of
wetland mitigation banks, which will hold entitlements until they are needed by
developers. 69  However, the most important environmental protection
experiment is the one currently in place in the Pinelands of New Jersey.7 '
Pineland Development Credits are created based on the development
expectations of severely restricted lands.'"' The scheme has been upheld by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.'72 Furthermore, in a recent taking challenge to the
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency's denial of a permit to build a house on a one-
164. Id. at 1000.
165. SeeLopesv. City of Peabody, 629N.E.2d 1312, 1315-16 (Mass. 1994).
166. See Hunzikerv. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1003(1995).
167. See Kelley v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Authority, 855 P.2d 1027, 1034-35 (Nev. 1993),
cert. denied 510 U.S. 1041 (1994).
168. See DANIEL REALLY. MANDELKER, LAND USE § 12.13 (2d ed. 1988). An early TDR
scheme was invalidated because it vested too much discretion in the local government to
designate receiving parcels. See Montgomery County Citizens' Ass'n v. Maryland Nat'l Capital
Park& Planning Comm'n, 522 A.2d 1328, 1336-37 (Md. Ct. App. 1987).
169. See generally Royal Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking
and Takings, 81 lowAL. REv. 527 (1996).
170. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:18A-31 to -54 (West 1999) ("Pinelands Development
Credit Bank Act").
171. See Gardener v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251, 256 (N.J. 1991).
172. See id. at 260-61 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co.v. NewYork, 438 U.S. 104(1978)).
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half acre lot because it was located in a Stream Environment Zone, the Ninth
Circuit held that the claim was unripe, in part, because the lot owner was given
TDRs."'73 The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's lack of
ripeness holding, but expressly refused to decide whether "TDRs may be
considered in deciding the issue of whether there has been a taking . . . as
opposed to the issue of whether just compensation has been afforded for such a
taking." '74 Three concurring justices argued that TDRs were not relevant to the
first issue because it would lead to undercompensation.'75
V. The Reemergence of the Watershed as a Land Management Unit
A. The Rediscovery of River Basin and Watershed Planning and
Management as an Environmental Protection Strategy
The long history of integrated land and water planning along hydrologic units
seemed to die in the United States in the 1980s. The Reagan administration failed to
fund the existing river basin commissions and the federal government continued its
withdrawal from subsidized water development. However, in the 1990s, watersheds
have reemerged as an ideal land use control unit and there are a variety of federal,
state and local watershed protection initiatives underway. Unlike countries such as
Australia, which have a rigorous catchment planning process,7 ' there are no uniform,
formal watershed planning processes to provide a framework for integration. No
consensus exists in the United States about the scale or boundaries of such units and
the proper allocation of control authority.'77 For example, the terms "watershed" and
"river basin" continue to be used interchangeably, although "watershed" now usually
refers to the catchment area of an individual stream or river, and "river basin" to the
drainage area of a large river and its tributaries. Most integrated management is
occurring in small watersheds and river basin planning remains focused on the water
resource alone. However, in contrast to the past, the increasing emphasis in river basin
management is on the use of existing supplies to satisfy both traditional right holders
-and environmental and Native American interests.
Integrated watershed and river basin planning in the United States is currently
a series of ad hoc experiments often driven by citizen and stakeholder-initiated
efforts to protect specific watersheds rather than by a desire to achieve a rational,
173. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'i Planning Agency, 80 F.3d 359, 362-63 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S.725 (1997).
174. Id. at 728.
175. id. at 745-750 (Justices Scalia, O'Connor & Thomas concurring).
176. The New South Wales Catchment Management Act of 1989 promotes the
sustainable management of soil, water quality and vegetation, and the restoration of degraded
areas in the state's catchment areas. See DA)AD FARRIER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 89-91
(2d ed. 1993); GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 206 (4th ed. 1995).
177. SeeAdler, supra note 16, at 1088-94.
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ecologically-based planning objective. The experiments often represent efforts to
overcome the obstacles placed by the current maze of planning and regulatory
programs which influence watershed management and use rather than the creation
of new planning and regulatory programs. Three related factors seem to drive the
reemergence of the watershed as planning unit. The first is a search for alternatives
to top-down federal water quality standards, which have generally been set on a
state-wide basis, and which do not take into account the special features of
individual watersheds. Federal standards, for example, have not effectively limited
nonpoint sources of poll because the implementation rests with local officials with
the power to control land use. Also, technologically-based standards do not reward
those who find cheaper mixed technology and management strategies to achieve a
quality objective. In addition, federal water policy initiatives have reached a dead
end. Congress is no longer interested in regional water development (except for a
few specific "pork barrel" dams) and the water agencies have been severely limited
by budget cuts. Executive leadership ended in the Carter Administration. Thus,
effective watershed development is often only possible when a coalition of federal,
state and private stakeholders agree on a plan that is built around the allowance of
some development consistent with ecological sustainability.'78
The current "driver" behind the federal EPA's interest in watershed planning
is section 1313(d) of the CWA7. 9 which requires the agency to set total maximum
daily loads ("TMDLs") for streams that do not meet existing water quality
standards. TMDLs are, in effect, a total watershed waste load allocation among
both point and nonpoint sources of pollution.'80 The allocations require additional
land use controls for nonpoint sources of pollution, such as improved forest
practices, beyond those required by the technology-forcing provisions of the CWA.
States must make the initial identification of watersheds and "water-quality
limited" stream segments that require TMDL allocations. States and the EPA were
initially reluctant to set TMDLs for most watersheds and to identify the sources of
pollution reduction, especially for watersheds where agricultural and timber
harvesting practices were degrading streams. The identification of water-quality
limited stream segments is a long, costly, and uncertain process, and TMDL
allocations pose complex equity and efficiency issues. States and the federal
government must allocate responsibility among all sources of pollution, point and
nonpoint, as well as among future polluters in a manner that is fair and efficient.
To further complicate matters, neither the federal government nor the states have
the authority to order the entire range of land use practices necessary to reduce
nonpoint sources of pollution. Nevertheless, courts have begun to force the EPA
178. Sw U.S. ENIvRONMENTrALPROcTBNAGENcy', WATERsHEDFAPPcAMcH RW oRK5 (1996).
179. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d).
180. See generally U.S. EN\ARONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GuIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY
BASED DECISIONS: THE TMDL PROCESS (1991).
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to set stringent TMDL allocations if the state plan is inadequate, 8' and so
watershed waste load trading schemes are being considered. The basic idea is to
meet TMDL requirements by encouraging nonpoint sources to withdraw land
from production to reduce sediment loads, rather than spend greater amounts to
upgrade a facility. However, the feasibility of such trading schemes has yet to be
established.
The second related factor is the emergence of grassroots organizations
interested in conserving and restoring specific places. Again, integrated
watershed management is often a conceptual focus of local initiatives. Local
efforts at watershed management integration are usually small-scale and
motivated by more than creating sustainable watershed. While small
watersheds are often the target of these efforts, local concern can produce state
and national watershed protection initiatives. Some of the local watershed
integration efforts are driven by the need to find alternative means of achieving
federal objectives, but local plans are often joined with efforts to develop place-
based sustainability strategies.'"2
The third factor is the recognition that there is an expanded range of
stakeholders who must be accommodated in any legitimate decision. These three
trends are synthesized in a recent federal EPA publication for allocation of
nonpoint source control program grants.' 3 "The watershed approach is commonly
characterized by (a) well-integrated partnerships, (b) a specific geographic focus,
(c) action driven by environmental objectives and by strong evidence and data,
and (d) coordinated priority setting and integrated solutions.'84
B. The Conceptual Shift: Bloregionalism, Adaptive Management
and Neo Pre-Human Background Standards
The most important conceptual development for modern watershed
protection is the shift in focus from rivers divorced from their terrestrial
ecosystem to aquatic ecosystems. The over-arching concept is bioregionalism,
which seeks to identify "whole systems comprised of sets of diverse, integrated,
natural subsystems and run by ecological laws and principles."'85 Policy planners
181. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 865 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Alaska
Center for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994). See generally OLIVER HOUCK, THE
CLEAN WATERACT'S TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY AND IMPLEMENTAION (1999).
182. See SARAH F. BATES ET AL., SEARCHING OUT THE HEADWATERS: CHANGE AND
REDISCOVERY IN WESrERN WATER POuCY 186 (1993).
183. See OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECnON AGENCY, NONPOINT SOURCE
PROGRAM AND GRANTS GUIDANCE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1997 AND FUTURE YEARS (1996).
184. Id. at 2.
185. David Haenke, Bioregionalism: A Territorial Approach to Governance and
Development of Northwest British Columbia (unpublished M.A. thesis) (on file with author),
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advocate moving from a single media or species approach to an ecosystem
approach to biodiversity management. Ecosystem management is a substantial
conceptual advance over prior natural resources management principles
because it collapses all conventional conceptual and jurisdictional boundaries.
and potentially integrates public and private lands and Water in a single
functional management unit. Bioregionalism both complements and
contradicts watershed management because it can support the watershed as
the organizing unit or it can suggest a larger management unit that subsumes
and subordinates watershed protection to other objectives.
The goal of ecosystem management is to establish background standards
against which present and future human use can be measured. It asks a radical
question: What was the region like before intensive human development?" The
pre-human (or pre-European settlement) landscape approach sets new
standards to guide modern management decisions to accomplish pre-human
conditions."7
Bioregionalism is supported by the substitution of the non-equilibrium for
the equilibrium paradigm in ecology and by the growing science of conservation
biology. Bioregionalism seeks to develop areas based on protection and
rehabilitation of all types of landscapes. This is forward rather than backward
looking development because it recognizes that humans will continue to alter
the landscape. Instead of a return to pre-human conditions, it seeks
management strategies incorporating human use. The influence of non-
equilibrium ecology can be seen in current restoration efforts that seek to
protect remnants of degraded ecosystems.
The ongoing efforts to restore the Florida Everglades is an example of the
implications of non-equilibrium ecology. The Florida Everglades is a large
freshwater marshland that sits on a shallow bedrock trough in south Florida.
The Everglades formed during the Pliocene and Pleistocene eras and constitutes
one of the world's largest wetland systems. During the past five thousand years
a rich peat, marl and muck base has formed which supports a biologically
quoted in Keane Callahan, Bioregionalism: Wiser Planning for the Environment, 45 LAND USE LAW AND
ZONING DIGESr 3 (Aug. 1993).
186. Environmentalists often make the mistake of assuming that all areas were
Edenic prior to European discovery and occupation, but this overlooks the land use
practices of indigenous peoples who often modified the land in substantial ways. For
example, an assessment of aboriginal farming practices in Australia concludes that "[iln
short, the Aboriginal farming system did not conserve the landscape of Australia. It created
a new landscape, which was more productive than the landscape they found." NEIL BARK &
JOHN GARY, GREENING A BROwN LAND: THEAusTRALIAN SEARCH FOR SUSTAINABLE LAND USE 9 (1992).
187. The Murray Darling Basin Commission has constructed a profile of the river
before and after human settlement. See generally MURRAY DARLING BASIN COMMISSION, THE
MURRAY (Norman Mackay & David Eastburn eds., 1990).
West & Northwest, Vol. 14, No. I, Winter 2008
diverse and water-dependent Caribbean and temperate ecosystem."M The
southern part of the ecosystem was designated as a national park in 1947,'89
while the northern part has been developed extensively for agricultural and
urban use. Today, the entire system is under stress. In brief, the natural system
depended on seasonal waterflows, but these flows have undergone a century of
human alteration in the name of flood control, and reclamation (drainage), and
conservation (urban growth). For example, a levee was constructed parallel to
the coastal ridge to stop sheet flows toward Palm Beach and Miami. Also,
basins and canals have been constructed to drain water from the Lake
Okeechobee agricultural area to the Atlantic and into the national park at times
different from the natural drainage cycles. The canals, culverts and levees have
changed the drainage cycle from attenuated to pulsating flows, and the
sustainability of the ecosystem has been subordinated to the minimization of
flood risks during the hurricane season (June-October) and the storage of water
during the dry season (November-May).' 90
The adverse impacts of the altered water flows on the Everglades National
Park became apparent in the late 1960s. Congress initially tried to solve the
problems by quantifying the park's reserved water right. Legislation enacted in
1970 guaranteed the park a 315,000-acre minimum flow.'9' However, increased
water diversion to Miami reduced flows, and the park became a dumping
ground for off-season regulatory releases during periods of abnormal winter
rain. The net result remains a radically altered flow regime that interrupts the life
cycles of many plant and animal species in the system. Seasonal drying and
flooding cycles have been disrupted, and some areas have been deprived of a
permanent surface water cover. In addition, when the water arrives it is loaded
with phosphorus from agricultural runoff.'92 Hardwood forests suffer from
prolonged flooding and Florida Bay experiences hypersalinity from reduced
freshwater flows. Altered flow patterns, along with other human encroachments,
is blamed for the large decline in wading bird populations.9 '
To "save" the Everglades, the current thinking is that the system must be
restored. This is not a simple return to the status quo. Rather, it involves the
188. See Patrick I. Gleason & Peter Stone, Age, Origin, and Landscape Evolution of the
Everglades Peatland, in EVERGLADEs: THE EcosYsTEM AND ITs RESTORATION 149 (Steven M. Davis &
John C. Ogden eds., 1994).
189. Seel6U.S.C.§401.
190. See generally Stephen S. Light & 1. Walter Dineen, Water Control in the Everglades: A
Historical Perspective, in EVERGLADE: THE EcosYsTEM AND ITs RESToRATION, supra note 188, at 47.
191. SeePub.L.No.91-282.
192. See Donald L. DeAngelis, Synthesis: Spatial and Temporal Characteristics of the
Environment, in EVERGLADES: THE EcosysTEM AND ITs RESTORATION, supra note 188, at 307.
193. See G. Thomas Bancroft et al., Relationships Among Wading Birds Foraging Patterns,
Colony Locations, and Hydrology in the Everglades, in EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS
REsTORATION, supra note 188, at 615.
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artificial reconstruction of pre-human intervention conditions by sophisticated
techniques, such as computer hydrographs and the design of experimental
management strategies that mimic the natural system to maintain a viable
smaller ecosystem.194 There is widespread agreement that more low-phosphorus
water must be put back in the system and that the sheet flows must be more
continual for longer periods of time during the wet season to sustain the system
during dry periods. 9' Experimental flows have been released but the results are
still uncertain. Existing agricultural uses must be reduced to decrease the
nutrients entering the system and this will require a large amount of public
money. All of this must be done under substantial- scientific uncertainty about
species andsystem responses to restoration efforts and management strategies
must be constantly evaluated and often revised. In February 1999, a group of
biodiversity experts complained to the Secretary of the Interior that the federal
government's actions had a high risk of failure because of insufficient releases
into the park.'96 Secretary Babbitt immediately agreed to the creation of a new
scientific panel to monitor the experiment.'97 The nub of the problem is the
need to reduce the nutrient loads from upstream sugar production. A lawsuit
brought by the federal government against Florida led to a settlement'98 and a
joint federal-state set of principles that were incorporated into a state statute. 99
The settlement contemplated the construction of a phosphorus reduction
facility, including the construction of new marshlands south of Lake
Okeechobee, that would be jointly funded by the federal government, the state
government and the agriculture industry through various taxes and fees. In
November 1996, however, the Florida voters rejected a state constitutional
194. For a brief discussion of the re-creation of simulated naturalness as a new
management baseline, see NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE
GRAND CANYON 38-49 (1995).
195. See Car J. Walters & Lance H. Gunderson, A Screning of Water Poly Alternatifve/fr Ecological
Restoration in the Everglades, in EVERGLADES: THE ECosysEM AND ITs RESrORATION, supra note 188, at 757.
The restoration of prior water levels will raise takings issues. On the other hand, if the state restores
riverine and wetland ecosystems by flooding land reclaimed from the beds of navigable waters,
"Itlhe property owner may not be entitled to compensation to the extent that value has been created
by government public works specifically enhancing their property." Sharon Tisher, Everglades
Rtoraton: A ConstitunalTakings Anaksi , 10 1. LAND USE& Er'wL. L. 1,34 (1994).
196. See William K. Stevens, Restoration Plan Does Too Little, Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 1999, at Al.
197. See William K. Stevens, Panel Will Monitor Plan for Everglades, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
1999, at Al8.
198. See United States v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 28 F.3d 1563, 1572 (I lth Cir.
1994), cert. denied 514 U.S. 1107 (1995).
199. See 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-115. The principles are reprinted in AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: A TEMPLATE FOR DECISION-MAKING IN THE 1990S AND
BEYOND (Aug. 5,1996).
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amendment that would have financed restoration programs by levying a one-
cent per pound tax on raw sugar harvested in Florida.
Another river restoration experiment is underway on the Colorado River in
Arizona. In 1963, the federal government began construction of a large storage
and hydropower dam, Glen Canyon Dam, above Grand Canyon National Park."0
The dam has changed the ecology of the river and the riparian corridor. For
example, temperatures are colder, which is threatening endangered fish, and
beach building sediment flows have been reduced. Since the 1980s, the federal
government has been studying the dam-induced changes, and in 1989 the
government agreed to prepare an EIS for the increase in hydroelectric
generating capacity at the dam. The EIS has focused attention on the possibility
of operating the dam in a different way to mitigate its adverse impacts.
The dam managers have focused on minor flow alteration patterns, but in
1996 they agreed to a large experimental "flood flow" to release tributary sediment to
build beaches in the Grand Canyon.20' This innovative action moves in the direction
of a baseline of simulated naturalness for the river below Glen Canyon Dam. There is
no simple or accepted definition of this concept. This management standard can
best be understood as a progressive standard which recognizes that ecosystems are
constantly changing and thus static preservation is impossible. The objective is to
use natural processes, such as erosion, to flow cycles and other ecological processes
as standards against which man-made changes can be measured and, if
appropriate, mitigated. This baseline approximates our understanding of pre-
intervention or background conditions, within the limitations imposed by science
and law due to the allocation of the river. With respect to the Grand Canyon, this
would include the following: (1) flows that approximate pre-dam seasonable flows,
(2) pre-dam water temperatures, and (3) pre-dam turbidity levels, which are both
biologically and geologically significant.
As the Everglades and Glen Canyon Dam experiments illustrate, the
restoration and continuous management of degraded ecosystems will be a
major environmental management task in the future. Experiments are now
underway on many river systems, wetlands, and some degraded landscapes to
restore the system to a baseline that reverses the most harmful effects of
altering the natural system functions. 2 2 If we move toward ecosystem
management, with its larger geographic scales, parts of the system will
200. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE GRAND
CANYON (1996) (introducing the history of the efforts to decide how to mitigate the
downstream corridor impacts of the operation of the dam).
201. For a more extensive discussion of the history of the 1996 flood release, see A.
Dan Tarlock, The Missouri River: The Paradox of Conflict Without Scarcity, 2 GREAT PLANS NAT.
RESOURCES 1. 1, 9-11 (1997); see also NAnONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RIVER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
IN THE GRAND CANYON (1996).
202. See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE RfSTORATION OF AQUATIC
EcOsYSTEMS (1992).
1096
West s Northwest, Vol. 14, No. 1, Winter 2008
inevitably be degraded or stressed. Nonetheless, restoration is a controversial
strategy with many environmentalists because of the argument that there is a
clear distinction between the "natural" and "artificial" and that "value increases
as naturalness increases.2 3 In his important exploration of the consequences of
the nonequilibrium paradigm, Professor Jonathan B. Wiener observes that the
non-equilibrium paradigm leads to resource protection strategies based on
stasis and separatism." 4 The view "that human action is separate from nature
and that the balance of nature is disturbed by human intrusion" either leads to
the view that humans undesirably interfere with nature of that "human action
represents desirable dominion over nature."205
Ecosystem management magnifies the importance of conservation
biology because this is the source of substantive management principles such
as the dedication of viable patches of habitat linked by biological corridors.2" It
also increases the importance of adaptive management as the major resource
management strategy0 7 because it supports the idea that experimental "place-
driven" strategies replace national standards.2"8 For example, the 1996 Safe
Drinking Water Amendment permits public water systems to substitute source-
water or watershed management
for filtration in consolidated ownership, and having control over access to,
and activities in, those watersheds, if the State determines (and the Administrator
203. Robert Elliot, Extincton, Restoration, Naturalness, 16 ENvr. ETHICS 135, 143 (1994). Compare
Alastair S. Gunn, The Restoration of Species and Natural Enviionments, 13 ENviL. ETHICS 291 (1991), with C.
Mark Cowell, Ecological Restoration and Environmental Ethics, 15 ENvrw. ETHICS 19 (1993).
204. See Jonathan Wiener, Law and the New Ecology: Evolution, Categories, and Consequences,
22 ECOLOGY L.O. 325, 338-345 (1995) (reviewing JONATHAN B. WIENER, BEAK OF THE FINCH: A
STORY OF EVOLUTION IN OUR TIME (1994)).
205. Id. at 340.
206. See generally Rebecca W. Thompson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea, But What Is It,
Will It Work, and Who Will Pay?, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 42 (1995); Rebecca W. Thompson,
Note, Saving an Endangered Act: The Case for a Biodiversity Approach to ESA Conservation Efforts, 45
CASEW. RES. L. REv. 553 (1995).
207. A recent study conducted by the National Research Council and the National
Academy of Sciences captures the essence of adaptive management:
Adaptive planning and management involves a decision making process based on
trial, monitoring, and feedback. Rather than developing a fixed goal and an
inflexible plan to achieve the goal, adaptive management recognizes the imperfect
knowledge of interdependencies existing within and among natural and social
systems, which requires plans to be modified as technical knowledge improves.
COMMITTEE ON RESTORATION OF AouATic ECOSYSTEMS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION
OFAouATIc ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 357 (1992).
208. See generally Thomas W. Jackson & Joshua S. Wyner, The New Hot Doctrine: Ecosystem
Management, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 28, 1994, at 15.
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concurs) that the quality of the source water and the alternative treatment
requirements established by the State ensure greater removal or inactivation
efficiencies of pathogenic organisms for which national primary drinking water
regulations have been promulgated or that are of public health concern than
would be achieved by the combination of filtration and chlorine disinfection." 9
C. The Roots Problem of Implementing Blo-regionalism: Vires and
the Delegation of Power to Private Parties
The major legal problem with bioregionalism or ecosystem management
is that it often has no statutory basis. Ecosystem or watershed management is a
scientific rather than legal concept, and at present it must be super-imposed
over existing statutes that recognize political jurisdictions justified more by
history than reason and the specific federal and state agency missions that
history has produced. As a result, watershed protection efforts must overcome
fragmented, incomplete and shared regulatory schemes, existing both among
the three levels of government and within these levels, as well as the existing
allocation of water and land entitlements. Thus, the geographic focus of legal
regulation is inevitably narrow.2 ° It is both difficult for mission agencies to cross
political and cultural boundaries and for units of government to cooperate and
share power among themselves, as well as the regulated community, now
characterized as "stakeholders."
Existing watershed experiments concentrate on small geographic areas
such as a creek watershed or a small river. There are numerous such watershed
initiatives underway in the United States. Some are simply for information
sharing; others seek to solve specific physical and regulatory problems by using
a consensus of stakeholders to secure government and private approval of
specific programs that meet federal and state regulatory objectives.2 These
efforts are an example of a number of experiments to supplement rigid
command and control regulation with more flexible collaborative governance
processes.2 Collaborative governance generally seeks to craft a consensus
among a limited group of stakeholders."3
209. 42 U.S.C.§ 300-9-1(b)(7)(c)
210. I have explored these problems in A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L.
REV. 1315 (1995).
211. For a comprehensive summary of western watershed groups and their activities,
see UNIVERSTY OF COLORADO NATURAL RESOURCES LAw CENTER, THE WATERSHED SOURCE BOOK:
WATERSHED -BASED SOLUTIONS TO NATURAL RESOURCE PROBLEMS (UNDATED).
212. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1 (1997).
213. Professor James Rossi is a leading critic of the fruits of open-ended public
participation in environmental decision-making triggered by the access revolution of the
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The ultimate watershed protection "deal" would be that local collaborative
processes would set watershed and basin environmental standards. For this
deal to work, private parties must forego the enjoyment of their full
development entitlements in return for public approval of watershed
management plans as consistent with environmental protection and related
mandates. The Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission recently
endorsed a version of this collaborative governance "deal." In Water Policies for the
Future, the Commission proposed "nest" watershed governance which would
involve: (1) the rival of river basin commissions as river basin forums
representing federal, state, tribal, local governments and stakeholder groups, (2)
the horizontal coordination of federal spending and regulation within river
basins, (3) the vertical integration of federal programs from the basin level to
watershed groups, and (4) greater reliance on adaptive management. 24 The
basin forum would engage in a planning process to establish "measurable
objectives for the basin which would comply with federal, tribal, 2 5 state, and
local substantive law. ' 2 6 To implement the plans and standards, a basin trust
fund would be established and fed by public and private monies. The number of
the proposal would be the enactment of congressionally authorized watershed
governance pilot programs. Watershed councils would identify specific plans
and projects to meet local needs in a manner consistent with the objectives
established in the basin plan and "jai New York project which is submitted by
watershed councils to comply with the objective set at the basin level shall be
presumed consistent with prevailing laws unless in sixty days it is found
inconsistent with relevant authorities.'27
This deal raises both vires and constitutional issues. State and federal
agencies generally lack the formal authority to adopt local or place-based
solutions as national ones. However, federal agencies are cobbling together
conservation and restoration plans that rely on government-private cooperation.
These efforts are vulnerable to legal challenges as ultra vires. Natural resources
management is not, in fact, place-driven; it is centralized. The great conservation
battles of this century have been fought to eliminate or minimize place-based,
that is, local and low, standards by subjecting them to the discipline of scientific
now-mythic late 1960s and early 1970s. See James Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of
Mass Participation in Deliberative Agency Decision-Making, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173 (1997).
214. WESTERN WATER POLICY REviEw ADVISORY COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE XV-XViX (hereinafter WATER POLICIES). I wish to disclose that I was the principal report
writer for the final report. However, the concept of a new template for river basin and
watershed governance was developed by the commission itself.
215. Indian tribes now have considerable power under the Clean Water Act to adopt
high water quality standards and to impose these on non-Indian water users. See, e.g.,
Flathead Reservation in Montana v. EPA, 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
216. WATERPouclEs, supra note 214, at xviii.
217. ld. atxix.
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national standards, and this lesson was carried forward into environmental
protection legislation. Congress could, of course, authorize agencies to adopt
place-based solutions as the national standard, but environmentalists remain
profoundly skeptical of doing so. The most notable effort to base a resource
conservation program on place-based standards, the Taylor Grazing Act," ' has
been a disaster for watersheds. The more likely scenario, as illustrated by the
Bay-Delta "process," is to experiment with the use-based stakeholder groups,
prodded by substantial federal and state involvement,2 9 to develop acceptable
solutions that achieve the objectives of federal environmental programs.
The substitution of voluntary watershed protection efforts for the
administration of existing laws is also vulnerable to legal challenges, and
several recent cases have held that voluntary protection does not comply with
the ESA's mandates. Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Daley illustrates a
successful legal challenge.22 In brief, the populations of evolutionarily
significant units of coastal Coho salmon have been declining for a variety of
anthropocentric and natural reasons. The decision whether to list the Coho as a
threatened species under the ESA has been a political football throughout the
1990s because protection and restoration require intensive public and private
land use and water management. The anthropocentric reasons include timber
harvest practices, livestock grazing and water diversions. In 1997, the National
Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") withdrew an earlier proposal to list the Coho
as a threatened species because the Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration
Initiative... would reverse the population decline.222 California units were listed
because the state dragged its feet in formulating a similar initiative.223 The
rejection of the state-federal "deal" has not, however, deterred Oregon from
moving ahead with its watershed protection strategy.224 Scientific opinion within
NMFS was divided on the effectiveness of the initiative and on the need to list
the species.
A magistrate judge invalidated the decision not to list because NMFS
applied the wrong ESA standard in its decision not to list.22' A species must be
listed if it is likely to become extinct in the foreseeable future, but the NMFS
218. 43 U.S.C. § 35.
219. See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1(1997).
220. 6 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1998).
221. The Oregon Coastal Salmon Restoration Initiative also supplemented the
Northwest Forest Management Plan adopted in 1994 to save the spotted owl.
222. See Threatened Status for Southern Oregon/Northem Califomia Coast
Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon, 62 Fed. Reg. 24,588 (May 6, 1997).
223. See id.
224. See THE OREGON PLAN FOR SALMON AND WATERSHED 1990 (on file with author).
225. See Oregon Natural Resources Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
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only evaluated the effect of the Initiative on population declines over a two year
period.226 The primary flaw in NMFS's approach was to base its decision not on
science but in faith in future actions taken by the legislative and executive
branches of Oregon.227 "NMFS . . . was unwilling to make the hard choice
required by the ESA. 228 This led to the conclusion that reliance on the state's
initiative was arbitrary and capricious because it relied on unimplemented,
largely voluntary future actions.229 Oregon's initiative relied in part on voluntary
watershed councils where landowner participation was "largely voluntary.""23
NMFS had rejected California's action plan, in part, because the state had not
funded a paper watershed initiative and landowner participation was voluntary.
The court found the agency's failure to explain why Oregon's initiative did not
pose the same risks as California's ."telling."23' "However laudable Oregon's
efforts to employ new management techniques to try to restore the Oregon
Coast levolutionary significant unitl, such future voluntary conservation effort
cannot be a substitute for listing."'2 32
Under existing programs, federal agencies retain the discretion to decide if
a stakeholder initiative complies with federal standards. This does not raise
constitutional issues because there has been no delegation of legislative
authority to private parties. If local groups had the authority to bind federal and
state governments to place-based solutions to specific implementation plans, it
would raise serious separation of power and due process issues.233 Courts by
and large have decided that the prohibition against the delegation of legislative
authority to administrative agencies, and to mixed private public bodies, is best
enforced by protecting the procedural rights of the regulated community.
Moreover, Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council34 signals an
unwillingness to use the delegation doctrine to police administrative agencies.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. Id. at 1152.
229. A series of previous district court opinions held that the United States Fish &
Wildlife Service ("FWS") could not rely on possible future management actions by other
agencies. See Biodiversity Legal Found. v. Babbitt, 943 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1996).; Friends of
the Wild Swan, Inc. v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service, 945 F. Supp. 1388 (D. Or. 1996).
The Ninth Circuit held that the FWS could not excuse its duty to designate critical habitat for
the California gnatcatcher on an elaborate reserve system created under a voluntary state
program. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. United States. Dep't of Interior, 113 F.3d
1121 (9th Cir. 1997).
230. See Oregon Natural Resources Council, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
231. See id.
232. Id.
233. See generally Carter v. Cater Coal Co., 298 U.S. 213 (1936).
234. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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In place of the delegation doctrine, Chevron suggests finding a regulation ultra
vires when an agency strays too far from congressional purpose.23 The
considerations that support nonenforcement of the delegation doctrine to
administrative agencies do not support is abandonment when power is
delegated to private parties. Private decision making, without some form of
effective public checks, reinforces unequal distributions of political power. This
creates a high risk that decisions will be made from a narrow perspective to the
exclusion of other relevant considerations and without control by either the
Executive or Congress. 36
V1. Conclusion
The reemergence of the watershed as a planning and regulatory unit in the
United States represents an ambitious and promising attempt to adapt the
rigidity of unnatural political boundaries to ecological reality. At the current
time, the efforts are ad hoc and experimental, and the jury is still out on their
success. Sometimes, they are limited to a local jurisdiction, but often, out of
necessity, they involve federal, state, and local governments. If watershed
protection is to become the principle vehicle for the practice of environmentally
sustainable land and water management, it must overcome two barriers. First,
inter-governmental cooperation must become the norm rather than the
exception as it is now. Public agencies must adapt their missions to this new
and incompletely defined idea. Second, historic water and land use entitlements
must be modified to make them consistent with the sustainability of watersheds
as ecologically functioning units. 3 7 The incorporation of a public dimension into
private entitlements must be the ultimate objective of the many ambitious
cooperation and consensus efforts currently underway across the United States.
This should be done in a manner consistent with stakeholder public
participation that does not paralyze the process.
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